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Studies in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda idealism I: 
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Abstract: In recent scholarship there has been a persistent tendency, especially 
among North-American scholars, to deny that Indian Yogācāra philosophy is a 
form of idealism. The discussion has naturally focused on the interpretation of 
Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā, a foundational text of the school, as well as one of the 
most accessible, which other researchers have taken to be denying the existence 
of a material world external to consciousness. 
  In this article, after noting some of the points in favor of a non-idealist read-
ing of the Viṃśikā, we shall offer a new reading that supports the old “standard”, 
but still widespread, interpretation that it indeed intends to deny the existence of 
physical objects outside of consciousness. We suggest that Vasubandhu develops 
in the Viṃśikā an extended argumentum ad ignorantiam where the absence of 
external objects is derived from the absence of evidence for their existence. This 
reading is the result of examining argumentation strategy rather than investigat-
ing the logical structure of individual proofs in isolation, and it takes cues from 
Vasubandhu’s strategy for refuting the existence of a self in Abhidharma-
kośabhāṣya IX. In addition, our reading looks at the entire Viṃśikā, rather than 
isolating a purported argumentative “core” (vv. 11–15), and draws attention to the 
relevance of some of its subtleties. Finally, we also suggest that Vasubandhu 
might have opted for a less direct argumentation strategy to prove the non- 
existence of the external world because of specific soteriological aspects of the 
doctrine of vijñaptimātratā.
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In recent scholarship there has been a persistent tendency, especially among 
North-American scholars, to deny that Indian Yogācāra philosophy, or what 
Buescher 2008 calls Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda, is a form of idealism. Here we under-
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stand by “idealism” the view that objects cannot exist without being cognized or, 
as it is sometimes put, that there is no “mind-independent world.” In the history 
of Western philosophy this view is sometimes referred to as “subjective idealism”, 
to distinguish it from other forms of idealism, such as “absolute idealism” and 
“transcendental idealism.” The classic statement of the position in Western 
philosophy was by the early modern Irish philosopher George Berkeley, who fa-
mously declared that “to be is to be perceived” (esse est percipi), implying thereby 
that something that is not perceived or cognized cannot exist. (Absolute idealism, 
on the other hand, is associated with the philosophy of Hegel, while Kant identi-
fied his own philosophy as transcendental idealism.) Wayman 1979, Kochu- 
muttom 1982, Hall 1986, Hayes 1988, Oetke 1992, King 1998, and most recently 
Lusthaus 2002 can all be seen as denying that Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda is idealism 
in the sense defined, though in somewhat different ways.1 The discussion has 
naturally focused on the interpretation of Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā2, a foundational 
text of the school, as well as one of the most accessible, which other researchers, 
naively or not, have taken to be denying the existence of a material world external 
to consciousness.
In the present study we shall argue for an idealist interpretation of the 
Viṃśikā. We, first, review the non-idealist interpretation of this text as presented 
in recent literature, then assess what we believe to be the strengths and weak-
nesses of such an interpretation. We conclude that, while the non-idealist inter-
pretation has certain points in its favor, it is not entirely satisfactory, hence a re-
newed attempt to work out an idealist reading is justified. The primary challenge 
of seeing the Viṃśikā as an idealist text is to ascertain its logical structure: if it is 
indeed presenting an argument in favor of the idealist position, then what kind of 
argument is it? Here we believe it is crucial to note that idealism is equivalent to a 
negative thesis, that is, the negation of the statement that there are uncognized 
objects or objects outside of consciousness. In another of his works Vasubandhu 
is clearly intent on establishing a negative thesis, namely, the ninth chapter of his 
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, where he attempts to prove that there is no self. We un-
dertake a detailed analysis of Vasubandhu’s argument there and determine that 
it has the structure of what is known in informal logic as an argumentum ad igno-
rantiam (argument from ignorance): there is no self, because there is no evidence 
for one. Then, by carefully comparing the Viṃśikā with AKBh IX we believe we are 
1 See also Rahula 1978: 79–85, which anticipates this position.
2 As demonstrated by Kanō 2008: 345, the title Viṃśikā is better attested for this work than 
Viṃśatikā.
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able to discern an argumentum ad ignorantiam for the conclusion that there are 
no uncognized objects in that text as well. Along the way, we draw attention to 
other applications of the argument from ignorance in classical Indian philoso-
phy. anupalabdheḥ, “because it is not apprehended”, is a reason frequently used 
to prove the non-existence of something, and came to be recognized as one of the 
three types of valid inferential reason (hetu) by Dharmakīrti. We conclude that the 
Viṃśikā is an idealist text, after all, which attempts to establish that there are no 
uncognized objects by means of reasoning that has the characteristics of an argu-
ment from ignorance, though Vasubandhu never identifies his argument as such, 
nor does he even explicitly state its conclusion but allows the reader to draw it for 
himself. Finally, we speculate about why Vasubandhu might have preferred a less 
explicit, indirect approach when it came to defending the central Yogācāra thesis 
of “mere-cognition” (vijñaptimātra).
1 Non-idealist readings of the  Viṃśikā 
For a sketch of the non-idealist position we shall refer to Hayes 1988, who follows 
Hall 1986, and Oetke 1992. In limiting the discussion to these scholars we do not 
mean to lump together all non-idealist interpretations of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda; 
Wayman and Lusthaus, in particular, are concerned with much more than just the 
Viṃśikā.3
In a section titled “Vasubandhu’s Phenomenalism” in his pioneering study 
Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs, Richard Hayes presents D. N. Shastri as an 
example of those who have viewed Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda as a kind of idealism. 
Shastri writes,
Subjective idealism consists in the assertion that there are no other things than thinking 
beings; that the things we believe ourselves to perceive are only the ideas of thinking beings. 
3 Lusthaus’s position vis-à-vis Yogācāra and idealism, we note, is rather confusing. While insist-
ing that the Yogācāra philosopher is not an idealist in the sense “that mind alone is real and that 
everything else is created by mind” (Lusthaus 2002: 533) – perhaps he is thinking of absolute 
idealism here – he nevertheless describes the Yogācāra view in terms that make it difficult to 
distinguish it from what would normally be considered idealism (or subjective idealism), namely, 
the doctrine that objects cannot exist outside of consciousness: “Yogācāra never denies that 
there are sense-objects (viṣaya, artha, ālambana, etc.), but denies that it makes any sense to 
speak of cognitive objects occcurring outside an act of cognition” (538). “Yogācārins deny the 
existence of objects in two senses: 1) In terms of conventional experience they do not deny ob-
jects such as chairs, colors, and trees, but rather they reject the claim that such things appear 
anywhere else than in consciousness. It is externality, not objects per se, that they challenge […]” 
(540). The same sort of confusion surfaces in Kochumuttom 1982.
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In short, the theory holds that there is no objective world independent of the perceiving 
mind […]. In Indian philosophy it is represented by the Yogācāra school of the Buddhists. In 
Western thought, Berkeley is the chief representative.4
By contrast, Hayes maintains that what Vasubandhu, for instance, is concerned 
to show in his Viṃśikā is simply that our experience can be completely accounted 
for by factors within consciousness itself, and that it is not necessary to posit any 
external objects. That, clearly, is not the same as denying that there are any exter-
nal objects – objects that exist independently of being cognized.
Vasubandhu is intentionally questioning the assumption that the correct account of experi-
ence is that a passively conscious subject experiences directly something entirely outside 
consciousness itself and is suggesting instead that what there really is is simply an inte-
grated experience onto which we project (or out of which we abstract) the notions of per-
ceiving subject and object perceived.5
Thus, the position being represented in the Viṃśikā is no more representational-
ism – the view that in perceptual experience we are directly aware of ideas or 
mental representations caused by external objects – than idealism. Here Hayes 
relies on Hall.
The term vijñapti signifies a “phenomenon” of consciousness, a “manifestation” to con-
sciousness, or a “percept” – so long as one bears in mind that these terms should not be 
taken in a naively realistic or a naively idealistic sense. […] To translate vijñapti here by 
“representation” conveys its public aspect, but seems to imply representation of something, 
presumably an external object or referent, which suggests a “representationalist” theory of 
knowledge. On the contrary, the purpose of the argument throughout the Viṃśatikā is to 
show that the concept of vijñapti suffices to make sense of perception and that the concept 
of an external referent (artha) is logically superfluous.6
We shall briefly address the interpretation of vijñapti as “percept” or “represen- 
tation” further below. To be sure, Hayes is aware that at the beginning of the 
treatise Vasubandhu says that the term mātra, “nothing but”, in vijñaptimātra, 
“nothing-but-vijñapti”, is “for the sake of ruling out objects” (arthapratiṣe- 
dhārtham), but according to Hayes this may only mean that “the objective compo-
nent of experience is being excluded from consideration” in working out a theory 
4 Shastri 1964: 42–43, Hayes 1988: 98.
5 Hayes 1988: 99 (Hayes’ emphasis). Kochumuttom (1982: 198) says that “the Yogācāra system 
has always been interpreted, invariably by all commentators and historians, as idealism of one 
kind or another” (italics ours) and proceeds (199–200) to offer a list of illustrative statements by 
modern interpreters, all of them Indian except for Stcherbatsky.
6 Hall 1986: 14, Hayes 1988: 100; our italics.
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of experience, not that its existence is being denied altogether. Later in the text, 
in vv. 11–15, which we shall refer to as the āyatana section (which investigates the 
āyatanas or “sense-spheres”), Vasubandhu appears to be arguing that physical 
objects, whether conceived as aggregates of atoms, as wholes, or as single atoms, 
are impossible. This is a key passage on which other scholars (e.g., Kapstein 1988) 
have based interpretations of the Viṃśikā as advocating idealism. But the point of 
the discussion according to Hayes is, again, not to deny the existence of physical 
objects but only to show that “reason” cannot postulate them as the causes of our 
experiences, since however they are conceived, they are logically incoherent. 
Thus, all features of our experience are to be explained in terms of the elements 
of experience itself. He writes, again referring back to Hall: “The motivation 
behind declaring that all experience is nothing but phenomena is, according to 
Hall, not to make ‘a metaphysical assertion of a transcendent reality consisting of 
“mind-only”. It is a practical injunction to suspend judgment: “Stop at the bare 
percept; no need to posit an entity behind it.” ’ ” 7
Oetke’s formulation of the non-idealist position is more concise than that of 
Hayes-Hall, but he seems to be making much the same point.8 Oetke maintains 
that the thesis Vasubandhu is arguing for in the Viṃśikā is best expressed as,
(T) There are no9 entities which become the objects of cognition,
which can be formulated more precisely as either,
(T1) There are no concrete particulars which are the objects of our experience,
or,
(T2) There are no material bodies which are the objects of our experience.
He supports this interpretation with a brief analysis of the āyatana section, which 
as noted before, is a crucial passage for the idealist interpretation of the Viṃśikā. 
He suggests that what Vasubandhu shows in this passage is just that the things we 
are experiencing are not aggregates of atoms or wholes, i.e., physical objects. 
Thus, strictly speaking, Vasubandhu is arguing for either (T1) or (T2). But – and 
this is Oetke’s main point – it follows from neither of these statements that there 
7 Hayes 1988: 100.
8 Oetke 1992, especially 218–219.
9 The printed version (Oetke 1992: 219) reads “not”, but we assume a misprint and read, as in T1 
and T2, “no”.
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are no physical objects. “These theorems exhibit the formal scheme: ‘There are 
no F-things which are G’ and since propositions of this form do not logically entail 
‘There are no G’s’ or ‘There are no F-things,’ both (T1) and (T2) do not strictly 
imply […] that there are no material bodies or other particulars of a world of phys-
ical things.”10
In order for either (T1) or (T2) to entail that there are no material bodies exter-
nal to consciousness one would have to supply another premise to the effect that 
“there are no non-mental particulars which are not objects of our experience”, 
and Vasubandhu never articulates any such premise. Therefore, the main idea 
Vasubandhu is arguing for in the Viṃśikā does not “entail the impossibility of an 
external world”, or that things exist only insofar as they are perceived, that is to 
say, subjective idealism.
2 Revisiting the  Viṃśikā 
While one could dispute some of the details of Hayes’ and Oetke’s analyses of the 
Viṃśikā, especially when it comes to the āyatana section, their overall impres-
sion of the work, that it stops short of a full-throated denial of the existence of 
external objects, seems correct. The reticence or ambivalence of the Viṃśikā in 
regard to external or uncognized objects becomes particularly evident when one 
compares it to Western presentations of idealism. To bring this out, we consider 
briefly the locus classicus for subjective idealism in modern Western philosophy, 
Berkeley’s Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.
There is little doubt that Berkeley in his Principles intends to deny the exis-
tence of objects outside of consciousness – what he refers to as “material sub-
stances.” As is well known, Berkeley felt that “materialism”, which he under-
stood to be the positing of material substances, and which he saw in the dominant 
philosophies of his day, the systems of Descartes and Locke, had to be refuted 
because it led directly to skepticism and atheism. In the Principles one is pre-
sented immediately with arguments to the effect that material substances are in-
conceivable and even contradictory. His main argument, developed in the first 
few paragraphs of the work, is that objects consist of various qualities: colors, 
shapes, smells, textures, and so on. But such qualities, often called sensible qual-
ities, are of such a nature as to exist only for a perceiving mind.
That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination exist without 
the mind is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various sensa-
10 Oetke 1992: 219.
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tions or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, what-
ever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them […]. The 
table I write on exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I would say that 
it existed – meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other 
spirit [i.e., conscious subject] actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was 
smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was per-
ceived by sight or touch.11
Thus, since objects such as “houses, mountains, rivers”, and so on are collections 
of qualities such as color, shape, and smell, they can only exist insofar as they are 
perceived. “For what are the aforementioned objects but the things we perceive 
by sense? And what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? And is it 
not plainly repugnant [i.e., contradictory] that any one of these, or any combina-
tion of them, should exist unperceived?”12
Whatever argument for idealism Vasubandhu is making in the Viṃśikā, if he 
is making any, it is not as explicit or direct as this. Vasubandhu does not launch 
an all-out, frontal assault, as it were, on the idea of objects existing outside of 
consciousness. The Viṃśikā seems to begin, rather – after citation of a scriptural 
passage which declares that the world consisting of three realms is mere cogni-
tion – with the idea that, since we sometimes experience “non-existent objects”, 
such as hairs floating before the eyes, we could always be experiencing non- 
existent objects! Vasubandhu then goes on to show that essential features of our 
experience, e.g., the fact that certain cognitions are restricted to certain times and 
places, or that persons in the same place experience objects in the same way, do 
not require us to postulate physical objects as, say, the causes of our cognitions 
(vv. 2–7); nor does anything the Buddha said entail that there are such objects 
(vv. 8–15); nor, finally, is their existence established by perception (vv. 16–17ab). 
Thus, the overall trend of the treatise seems to be merely that, considering all the 
available evidence, our experience seems compatible with the non-existence of 
external objects. It offers no direct proof that they are in fact absent. Even the 
arguments of the āyatana section appear not to provide any such proof. For, first 
of all, those arguments subserve the assertion that scripture does not establish 
the existence of objects. In other words, that objects are impossible, no matter 
how one conceives of them, is not what Vasubandhu is primarily trying to prove 
in this section. Second, if Vasubandhu really were intent on proving that objects 
are impossible as a way of showing that external objects do not exist – for impos-
sibility implies non-existence – and if this were the main point he wanted to make 
11 Berkeley 1970: 246–247.
12 Berkeley 1970: 247.
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in his treatise, then why didn’t he do so at the very outset, as Berkeley does? 
Finally, if Vasubandhu thought he proved in this section that objects are impos- 
sible, then other arguments of the treatise, in particular those of the first section 
to the effect that an external object needn’t be posited in order to account for our 
experience, would be rendered moot. For such objects being impossible, there 
would be no question of postulating them for any purpose; their absurdity would 
immediately rule out their playing any role in causing our perceptions.13
Thus, the non-idealist reading of the Viṃśikā cannot be dismissed so easily. 
It is perhaps not the text of the Viṃśikā itself that inclines one to resist it so much 
as the later development of the tradition to which it belongs and the critique 
of that tradition by outsiders, Buddhist and Brahmin alike. Both clearly depict 
Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda as denying the existence of objects outside of conscious-
ness, i.e., “external objects” (bāhyārtha); and so one would expect that the 
Viṃśikā, which stands at the beginning of the development of Yogācāra- 
Vijñānavāda as a rigorous, coherent philosophical system, would also be defend-
ing that position.
There is, however, another consideration that inclines us to resist the non- 
idealist interpretation and encourages us to reconsider an idealist reading of the 
text. What, after all, is Vasubandhu trying to say according to the non-idealist 
interpretation? We would put it as follows: Our immediate awareness in percep-
tion is not, as direct or commonsense realism maintains, of material objects, but 
of sensa, percepts, representations, sense impressions – whatever one wishes to 
call them – which are private, transitory, mental entities.14 Hayes and Hall would 
add that Vasubandhu also suggests that all the features of our sense experience, 
in particular, that one has particular perceptual experiences at particular times 
and locations, can be explained by factors that reside within consciousness itself. 
But if this is what Vasubandhu really shows in the Viṃśikā – once again, that we 
can describe and account for our perceptual experience without referring to ma-
terial objects – then the obvious question is: What evidence is there for material 
13 Thus, Berkeley, after arguing himself that there is no way material objects could cause our 
perceptions – “though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confes-
sion are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced, since they own themselves 
unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should 
imprint any idea in the mind” (Berkeley 1970: 255) – apologizes: “I am afraid I have given you 
cause to think me needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For to what purpose is it to dilate 
on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two to anyone who is 
capable of the least reflection?” (256).
14 This wording is adapted from Hirst 1967: 130. A classic statement of the view that objects are 
reducible in some way to such sense data, usually known as “phenomenalism”, is Ayer 1956: 
91–148.
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objects? If the answer is none, then there is no reason to think that they exist.15 
On the non-idealist reading of the Viṃśikā, then, Vasubandhu may not explicitly 
say that there are no material objects, but he doesn’t have to. The reader is left to 
draw that conclusion for himself, and it would not seem far-fetched to suggest 
that that is precisely what Vasubandhu could be intending him to do.
Thus, even the non-idealist interpretation of the Viṃśikā depicts the text, 
wittingly or not, as presenting an incomplete argument for the non-existence of 
objects outside of consciousness, which the reader simply has to complete for 
him- or herself in one easy step. But it would be rather odd for Vasubandhu, or 
any author, to leave the final conclusion of his work to the reader in this way. 
Perhaps then the Viṃśikā, after all, is somehow arguing for idealism from the 
outset, though by a different method than Berkeley’s?16 At the very least, we are 
left with the sense that we do not fully understand what is going on in this text. It 
merits another look.
3  Reconsidering an idealist reading of the 
 Viṃśikā : a new approach
In attempting to reconsider the idealist interpretation of the Viṃśikā, it is doubt-
ful one will make much headway just going back over the text. It is true that the 
critical edition of the text by Sylvain Lévi, published in 1925, can still be improved 
on the basis of a manuscript now available in photographic reproduction, as Bal-
cerowicz and Nowakowska have demonstrated in their recent reedition.17 Harada 
and Hanneder have, moreover, independently arrived at the conclusion that what 
we thought to be the first stanza of the text is most likely a “versification” of an 
argument originally presented in prose.18 In addition to revisiting philological 
evidence for the Viṃśikā itself – including the recently published Sanskrit frag-
15 For a modern example of the employment of this strategy to reject the view that unperceived 
objects can exist see Stace 1934.
16 One sometimes suspects that the motive behind the non-idealist interpretation of the Viṃśikā 
is to save an important school of Buddhist philosophy from advocating what nowadays is a com-
pletely discredited view (for similar remarks, see Schmithausen 2005: 49). If, however, even the 
“non-idealist” reading does not fully succeed in doing this, then the most charitable way to read 
the text might be as presenting the strongest argument for idealism one is able to find in it.
17 See Mimaki et al. 1989 for the photographs, and Balcerowicz/Nowakowska 1999 for the reedi-
tion and a Polish translation.
18 Harada 2003, Hanneder 2007.
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ments of a commentary by Vairocanarakṣita19 – we might also look for new evi-
dence in other writings of Vasubandhu. Schmithausen considers the following 
works also to have been written by the author of the Viṃśikā:20
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya
Triṃśikā
Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa
Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā
Pañcaskandhaka
Vyākhyāyukti
Now, the Triṃśikā, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Pañcas-
kandhaka, and Vyākhyāyukti are also considered Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda works.21 
One might at first be tempted to examine them for evidence that Vasubandhu be- 
lieved that objects do not exist outside of consciousness. Yet we are doubtful that 
philological improvements to the text of the Viṃśikā as well as a re-examination 
of these writings will bring us any further. Any evidence one might find in them of 
Vasubandhu’s true position regarding the external world is likely to be just as 
ambiguous as it is in his Viṃśikā. For it is likely that any statement to the effect 
that “we are not aware of external objects”, and possibly even any statement to 
the effect that “there are no external objects”, will be able to be construed 
phenomenologically, as pertaining just to our experience, i.e., as meaning that 
the things we are experiencing are not external, physical objects, and not onto- 
19 Kanō 2008.
20 Schmithausen 1987: 262, n. 101. Kritzer (2005: xxvi) accepts this list in a recent review of the 
problem concerning the works of Vasubandhu. Frauwallner’s proposal of two Vasubandhus 
made the older the author of various Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda commentaries, while the younger 
was author of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya as well as the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, Viṃśikā, and 
Triṃśikā (cf. Frauwallner 1951, 1961: 129–132, and 2010: 374f., and the discussion of Franco/Prei- 
sendanz 2010: XV–XVII). Reexamining textual and inscriptional evidence, Deleanu (2006: vol. 2, 
186–194) conjectures that Vasubandhu lived between ca. 350 and 430, and assumes that only one 
Vasubandhu was the author of all works listed here. There are of course also many other works 
attributed to Vasubandhu, but it is not necessary to go into further details here (cf. Skilling 
2000). 
21 The Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa advocates the ālayavijñāna and can on this ground be considered 
a Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) work, in spite of Lamotte’s demonstration of its Sautrāntika character 
(Schmithausen 1967: 111f.). The Pañcaskandhaka also advocates the ālayavijñāna and can there-
fore likewise be considered a Yogācāra work.
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logically, as denying that there are material objects outside of consciousness or 
asserting that things only exist if they are perceived (esse est percipi). Semantic 
considerations about the meaning of such terms as “visible form/matter” (rūpa), 
“thing/object/referent” (artha) or “external” (bāhya) that occur in such state-
ments are helpful, but ultimately insufficient, as the import of such statements 
can only be reasonably determined by careful scrutiny of the argument strategies 
that support them.22 
We shall therefore adopt the following approach. Taking as our hypothesis 
that Vasubandhu is denying the existence of objects outside of consciousness in 
the Vimśikā, are there any other writings of his in which he is clearly denying the 
existence of something? If there are, then an effort should be made to determine 
whether there are any significant similarities between the argument strategies 
employed in the Vimśikā and in those other writings. But no sooner do we ask this 
question – are there any other works in which Vasubandhu’s main purpose is to 
deny the existence of something? – than the answer springs to mind: the ninth 
chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, where Vasubandhu refutes the existence 
of a self. We shall, then, in what follows, offer an analysis of Abhidharma-
kośabhāṣya IX in order to ascertain exactly what kind of argument Vasubandhu 
develops against the existence of a self there – we would maintain it has gone 
unrecognized – with a view, ultimately, to determining whether he might be em-
ploying a similar kind of argument to prove the non-existence of objects outside 
of consciousness in his Vimśikā.
4  Vasubandhu’s argument strategy for  
the non-existence of the self in 
 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX is by no means an uncomplicated text. It is an elabo-
rate discussion of all the evidence for the existence of a self, or anything resem-
bling one (e.g., a “person” or pudgala as upheld by the Vātsīputrīyas/Sāṃmitīyas, 
22 For a complementary approach that relies on aspects of terminological, textual and doctrinal 
coherence – though, we would argue, it is one that in a veiled fashion also considers argument 
strategies – see Schmithausen 2005. It should be noted that Schmithausen discusses the Cheng 
weishi lun, which inspired by Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā argues for vijñaptimātratā relying on the 
notion of a “store-consciousness” (ālayavijñāna) which holds seeds from which our objects of 
experience evolve. For a treatment of the problem of idealism in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda thought 
with special consideration of the topic of self and other see Yamabe 1998. 
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who are fellow Buddhists), brought forward by other philosophers. We believe 
that the most important feature to note about it is that it is primarily, if not exclu-
sively, critical in its method: it is mainly devoted to refuting other theories. Vasu-
bandhu never presents any direct proof that there is no self in the form of a proper 
inference or anumāna. 
Vasubandhu announces what we take to be his main argument at the very 
beginning of the treatise.23 The question is posed: How is it understood that the 
designation “self” refers just to a temporally limited section of a series of ska- 
ndhas (aggregates) and not to something else? Vasubandhu responds, “Because 
of the absence of perception and inference” in regard to any such thing 
( pratyakṣānumānābhāvāt). For, he explains, there is, in the absence of any ob-
struction, an immediate, perceptual apprehension of those entities or dharmas 
which exist, for example, of the six kinds of objects of the senses and of the mind 
(manas). And we are also able to infer things that exist, as for instance when we 
infer the existence of the five external senses from the fact that, when some of the 
causes of perception are present – an object placed in the light and mental atten-
tion (manaskāra) – a perceptual apprehension of an object sometimes occurs, but 
at other times it doesn’t occur (e.g., for someone who is deaf or blind). Thus, one 
postulates a sense-faculty as another cause whose presence or absence in con-
junction with the other factors brings about a perception. “But it is not like this 
for the self; [hence] it does not exist”, Vasubandhu says.24 In other words, there 
are no such considerations that would require us to infer or postulate one; there-
fore, we can conclude there isn’t one.25
Thus, Vasubandhu’s initial argument against the existence of a self appears 
to be: there is no self because there is no evidence for one!26 This is a type of argu-
23 Claus Oetke presents a much more detailed synopsis of the text than we are about to give, in 
Oetke 1988: 195–209. The most in-depth analysis to date is Duerlinger 2003. It will be evident 
from what follows that we disagree with Duerlinger’s overall interpretation of the text as present-
ing a positive theory of persons, though we find the theory he sees in the text to be intriguing. 
Roughly, Duerlinger believes that Vasubandhu holds that we are both conventional entities “as 
objects of conceptions of ourselves” and ultimately exiting entities, insofar as we are “the same 
in existence as collections of aggregates.” See esp. Duerlinger 2003: 30f. for a more nuanced 
statement.
24 AKBh 461: 12–13: na caivam ātmano ’stīti nāsty ātmā; reading ātmano for ātmato. All passages 
from AKBh IX have been checked against the critical edition AKBhL.
25 This strategy may be an extension of the refutation of the pudgala in Vasubandhu’s Mahā- 
yānasūtrālaṅkārabhāṣya; cf. our Appendix below for a discussion of relevant passages.
26 The terms “argument”, “evidence”, and “proof” are not being used in any technical sense in 
this article. Roughly, a “proof” is an attempt to establish or demonstrate a thesis by means of 
some “argument”, which is a pattern of reasoning, with a definable logical structure, that draws 
a certain conclusion from a set of premises. “evidence” usually means a reason cited when as-
  The interpretation of Vasubandhu’s  Viṃśikā    721
ment that in Western philosophy is identified as an argument from ignorance 
(argumentum ad ignorantiam), and we shall discuss this type of argument in 
Indian philosophy, or at least certain varieties of it, more generally further below. 
Our concern at this point is to show that the rest of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX is 
but the elaboration of such an argument.
Vasubandhu does not initially consider objections to the assertion that there 
is no perceptual or inferential evidence for a self. He will, in fact, interestingly 
enough, never take up a serious challenge to the claim that the self is not per-
ceived.27 Later in the text he will weigh a series of considerations that other phi-
losophers believed compel us to postulate or infer the existence of a self. But in 
the first part of the text he is occupied with refuting the doctrine of the person 
( pudgalavāda) of the Vātsīputrīyas or Sāṃmitīyas.28 Yet this is quite in keeping 
with the overall strategy of the text to provide an argument from ignorance. A 
Buddhist may perhaps readily accept that there is no perceptual or inferential 
evidence for a self but will still want to know if there is any scriptural evidence. 
The Vātsīputrīyas indeed put forward the pudgalavāda as a teaching they be-
lieved is implied by key Buddhist doctrines, especially the doctrines of karman 
and transmigration. They also maintained that the Buddha refers to a pudgala in 
some of his statements. In order to provide a compelling argument from igno-
rance against the existence of a self, then – i.e., that there is no evidence of any 
kind for a self, neither perceptual nor inferential nor scriptural – Vasubandhu 
must show that there is no reason to hold that the Buddha ever accepted the exis-
tence of anything even like a self, such as a pudgala.
Vasubandhu does not, however, immediately discuss scriptural passages. 
Rather, he launches into a lengthy attack against the coherence of the pudgala-
vāda. The pudgalavādins maintain that there is a pudgala which is neither the 
same nor different from the skandhas, but, precisely because it is not different 
from them, it is not an eternal self; at the same time, it is the bearer of karman and 
the entity that transmigrates and attains Nirvāṇa.29 Vasubandhu begins by posing 
serting something, the ground for one’s assertion. Thus, perception or inference both can count 
as evidence.
27 Though, as we shall see below, he does argue that a pudgala could not be the object of any of 
the six vijñānas.
28 Henceforth referred to, for convenience, as just the Vātsīputrīyas. Vasubandhu refers to the 
adherents of the pudgala doctrine as “Vātsīputrīyas” (AKBh 461,14). Yaśomitra (AKVy 699,3) 
glosses: vātsīputrīyā āryasāṃmatīyāḥ. Both schools are recorded as advocating pudgalavāda. 
Sources regarding the relationship between Vātsīputrīyas and Saṃmatīyas/Sāṃmatīyas/
Sāṃmitīyas are presented in Kieffer-Pülz 2000: 296f. 
29 For a concise summary of the pudgalavāda see Eltschinger 2010: 294–296. See also Priestly 
1996.
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the dilemma: does such a pudgala exist “substantially” (dravyataḥ) or “nomi-
nally” ( prajñaptitaḥ)? If the first, then the pudgala would have to be different 
from the skandhas after all, for it would have its own distinct nature. If the latter, 
the pudgalavādin just agrees with Vasubandhu: the pudgala has mere nominal 
existence (461,14–18). To avoid this dilemma the pudgalavādin proposes that “the 
pudgala is designated in dependence on the skandhas” (skandhān upādāya pu- 
dgalaḥ prajñapyate) (461,19–20).30 Vasubandhu proceeds ruthlessly to decon-
struct this statement – what, for instance, does “in dependence on” mean? – 
showing that however it is interpreted it involves the denial of one of the 
pudgalavādin’s premises; typically, it will entail that the pudgala is either the 
same or different from the skandhas (461,21–463,9). The Vātsīputrīyas also appar-
ently held that the pudgala is perceptible.31 Vasubandhu is therefore also intent 
on showing that there is no conceivable way it could be cognized by any of the six 
vijñānas, and by visual cognition in particular (463,10–465,9). The purpose of this 
last passage concerning the unknowability of the pudgala, we would submit, is 
not merely to establish that we don’t actually have a cognition of a pudgala but, 
more broadly, that the Vātsīputrīya theory of a cognizable pudgala which satisfies 
the condition of being neither the same nor different from the skandhas is unten-
able, hence it is not something the Buddha ever could have taught.
Next, Vasubandhu adduces a number of “explicit” (nītārtham, 465,18) scrip-
tural passages that suggest that when it comes to talking about a “person” one 
has only to do with the skandhas, that terms like sattva, nara, mānuṣya, puruṣa, 
and pudgala are “mere names, mere expressions” (sañjñāmātrakaṃ vya-
vahāramātrakam), and that no self is to be found among the dharmas (entities) 
(465,10–466,17).32 And he ridicules the idea that these passages, even the famous 
saying “All dharmas are without self ”,33 are not pramāṇas for the pudgalavādin 
30 More precisely, on “internal, assimilated, presently existing skandhas” (ādhyātmikān upāttān 
vartamānān skandhān). Cf. AK(Bh) 1.34 and 39ab for definitions of “assimilated” and “internal”, 
respectively.
31 See Kathāvatthu I.1: puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena.
32 In other words, Vasubandhu at this point, in showing that there is no scriptural evidence for 
a person, turns properly to scriptural exegesis. As Eltschinger (2010: 299) notes of the discussion 
that corresponds to this in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkārabhāṣya, “The philosophical quarrel then 
turns into an exegetical one, for the Buddha, no one would dare to contend, has often made use 
of the notion pudgala. Now, did he resort to it in a purely pragmatic and didactic purpose, as the 
adversary of the pudgala repeatedly contends, or did his statements concerning the pudgala refer 
to an ens – whatever its precise ontological status – as the Pudgalavādin (allegedly) has it?” 
33 SN 3.133, DhP v. 279, SN 4.400–401.
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because they are not found in the Vātsīputrīya canon (466,17–24)! Finally,34 Vasu-
bandhu considers a series of other scriptural texts and orthodox doctrines that 
would seem to imply the existence of a pudgala: e.g., the teaching of the omni-
science of the Buddha (467,13–468,1),35 the text that speaks of “the burden, the 
taking up of the burden, the laying down of the burden, and the carrier of the 
burden”36 (468,1–9), the characterization of the denial of spontaneously arising 
beings (sattva upapādukaḥ) as a false view (468,10–14), the Buddha’s refusal to 
say whether the living being is the same as the body or not (469,9–24)37 and to 
explicitly deny for Vacchagotta that there is a living being or a self at all (469,25–
470,18),38 his statement that “I have no self” is a false view (471,19–23), the doc-
trine of transmigration (471,24–472,3), and the Buddha’s claims that he remem-
bered being this or that person in a previous existence (472,3–7). None of these 
statements or teachings, Vasubandhu shows, is to be taken as referring to or im-
plying that there is a pudgala in the sense understood by the Vātsīputrīyas.
We would suggest that the purpose of this lengthy section on the pudgala-
vāda, which comprises more than half of the work (461–472), is not to refute the 
pudgalavāda per se, but to show that there is no scriptural basis for belief in a 
self, even in the guise of a pudgala. The rest of the text, then, which takes up 
arguments made by the Tīrthikas (or Tīrthakaras), or that are common to both 
Tīrthikas and the Vātsīputrīyas, is to show that other rational considerations do 
not require us to postulate a self, either.39 This of course is not quite the same as 
34 After discussion of further scriptural passages that say that any (false) idea of a self pertains 
only to the skandhas, 1204,3–1205,3.
35 The pudgalavādin maintains that only a being who endures over time could know everything, 
while Vasubandhu argues that the omniscient Buddha is a series of skandhas which do not 
always actively know everything but have the capacity to cognize whatever is desired to be 
known.
36 SN 3.25–26. See Frauwallner 2010: 16.
37 If the pudgala were just the skandhas, then it would be.
38 He goes on to discuss why the Buddha did not answer any of the unexplained questions, 
470,19–471,19.
39 This part is introduced by the sentence, ye ’pi ca dravyāntaram evātmānaṃ manyante 
tīrthakarāḥ teṣām eva mokṣābhāvadoṣaḥ niṣkampaḥ (472,14–15), “And those Tīrthakaras who be-
lieve the self to be a different substance – for them in particular the fault of the absence of libera-
tion is immovable.” This refers back to the very beginning of the text, 461,2–4: kiṃ khalv ato 
’nyatra mokṣo nāsti? nāsti. kiṃ kāraṇam? vitathātmadṛṣṭiniviṣṭatvāt. na hi te skandhasantāna 
evātmaprajñaptiṃ vyavasyanti. kiṃ tarhi? dravyāntaram evātmānaṃ parikalpayanti, ātmagrā- 
haprabhavāś ca sarvakleśā iti. “Is it then really the case that there is no liberation anywhere 
else but here [in our teaching]? There is not. Why not? Because [others] are attached to the 
false view of a self; for they do not discern that the designition ‘self’ refers only to the series of 
skandhas. What then [do they think it refers to]? They imagine that the self is indeed another 
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saying that there is no anumāna that proves the existence of a self. Vasubandhu, 
interestingly enough, never considers a formal anumāna to that effect. Neverthe-
less, the reasons or grounds for believing in a self that he criticizes are in many 
instances the very factors that were cited as “inferential marks” (liṅga) of the self 
by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers.40
Thus, Vasubandhu argues: a self is not required as the factor that combines 
mental states in the act of memory (472,16–473,14);41 nor is it the one who cog-
nizes (473,15–474,9);42 nor could it be otherwise causally responsible for the aris-
ing of cognitions (e.g., as that with which the mind comes into contact) (475,1–12) 
or be the substratum (āśraya) of cognitions and other mental states (475,12–
476,3);43 nor is it the referent of the notion “I” (476,4–16)44 or the one who is happy 
and unhappy (476,16–18);45 nor, finally, is it necessary or even logical to postulate 
a self as the agent of karman and the enjoyer of the results of karman (476,19–
478,13).46 All of these phenomena can be explained otherwise, without introduc-
ing a self, while the hypothesis of a self also is not free from problems.47 Thus, the 
implication seems to be, none of the reasons cited by other philosophers for infer-
ring a self is conclusive. Hence, there is no inferential evidence for a self.
In sum, on our reading Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX should be interpreted as a 
lengthy argument from ignorance: (1) There is no perception of a self. As noted, 
Vasubandhu seems to take this as a given and doesn’t feel compelled to argue for 
substance (dravyāntaram evātmānam), but [in reality] the defilements arise from the grasping of 
a self.”
40 Thus, e.g., NS 1.1.10: icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam; “Desire, aver-
sion, effort, pleasure, pain, and cognition are the inferential marks of the self.” VS 3.2.4: prāṇā- 
pānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnāś cety 
ātmaliṅgāni; “Exhaling, inhaling, closing and opening [the eyes], life, the movement of the 
mind, the change in another sense [when an object is perceived by one sense], pleasure and 
pain, desire and aversion, as well as effort are the inferential marks of the self.” 
41 The opponent asks: yadi tarhi sarvathāpi nāsty ātmā kathaṃ kṣaṇikeṣu citteṣu cirānubhūta- 
syārthasya smaraṇaṃ bhavati pratyabhijñānaṃ vā? (472,16–17).
42 The opponent asks: evaṃ ko vijānāti, kasya vijñānam ity evamādiṣu vaktavyam? (473,13).
43 The opponent asserts: avaśyam ātmābhyupagantavyaḥ smṛtyādīnāṃ guṇapadārthatvāt tasya 
cāvaśyaṃ dravyāśritatvāt teṣāṃ cānyāśrayāyogād iti cet (475,22–23, emended according to AKBhL 
148). Cf. NBhTh 292,2–3; NVTh 391,9–15.
44 ātmany asati kimarthaḥ karmārambhaḥ ahaṃ sukhī syām ahaṃ duḥkhī na syām ity eva- 
marthaḥ? ko ’sāv ahaṃ nāma yadviṣayo ’haṃkāraḥ? (476,4–5).
45 yady ātmā nāsti ka eṣa sukhito duḥkhito vā? (476,16).
46 asaty ātmani ka eṣāṃ karmaṇāṃ kartā kaś ca phalānāṃ bhoktā bhavati? (476,19).
47 E.g., it cannot really function as a substratum or an agent. In general, na hi kiñcid ātmanaḥ 
upalabhyate sāmarthyam auṣadhakāryasiddhāv iva kuhakavaidyaphuḥsvāhānām; “For no ca-
pacity of the self is apprehended, any more than [a capacity] of the Phuḥ!’s and Svāha!’s of quack 
doctors when it is established that the effect has been brought about by herbs” (475,10–11).
  The interpretation of Vasubandhu’s  Viṃśikā    725
it (nevertheless, he shows that the pudgala is not cognized by any of the six per-
ceptual cognitions), though it will of course be challenged later by Brahminical 
philosophers. (2) There is no statement of the Buddha affirming a self – to the 
contrary, there are many statements by which he appears to deny it – nor is there 
any orthodox teaching that implies its existence. Finally, (3) there is no basis 
for inferring a self. Therefore, given the total lack of evidence for a self we may 
conclude that there is none. Of course, in the process of making these points 
Vasubandhu presents a rich alternative account of facts that supposedly justify 
the existence of a self, such as memory. But we would argue that this is secondary 
to his main purpose, which is simply to prove, indirectly by “non-apprehension” 
(anupalabdhi), that there is no self.
Note that according to our interpretation Vasubandhu is not saying that the 
proponents of a self have failed to prove one, therefore we are justified in not 
believing in one – the burden of proof is on them. He is saying something much 
stronger than this, namely, since there is no evidence for a self, a self does not 
exist. The principle behind this argument is that if something exists, it will some-
how make its presence known; it will be accessible to one of the pramāṇas. If 
there is no evidence for something, if no pramāṇa reveals it, then we may con-
clude that it does not exist to be revealed.
We have of course been much more explicit about what is going on in 
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX than Vasubandhu is himself. He offers no summary at 
the end of the text like the one we have just provided. Therefore, it would be de-
sirable if there were other, independent support for this reading. We believe that 
such support can be found, first, in Uddyotakara’s account of the Buddhist objec-
tions to the Nyāya arguments for the existence of the self that he discusses in his 
Nyāyavārttika.
At NV 1.1.10, Uddyotakara presents the Buddhist assertion that the various 
phenomena cited in the sūtra as the “inferential marks” (liṅgas) of the self – 
desire, aversion, etc. – all of which presuppose memory, can be explained in 
terms of causal relations between cognitions without bringing in a self as the ele-
ment that binds them together. And he (the Buddhist) concludes, “Thus, this con-
necting up [of past and present experiences in memory] being possible otherwise, 
it is not capable of proving the existence of a self.”48 The idea here is not that 
there is another better (or simpler)49 explanation of memory than the one that 
48 NVTh 389,1: tad idaṃ pratisandhānam anyathā bhavan nātmanaḥ sattāṃ pratipādayituṃ 
śaknoti.
49 Siderits 2003: 28, 77 suggests that Vasubandhu is arguing that a “reductionist” view of the 
person is preferable to one that postulates a real, irreducible self, because it is “lighter”, i.e., 
more parsimonious. But nowhere in AKBh IX does Vasubandhu mention parsimony (lāghava) as 
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appeals to a self, but that, given the existence of alternative explanations, one 
doesn’t have to bring in a self to explain memory. Thus, the various liṅgas listed in 
1.1.10 are not conclusive. Uddyotakara’s reading of the type of arguments Vasu-
bandhu develops in the latter half of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX against various 
Tīrthika theories – we can’t be sure he had Vasubandhu specifically in mind, but 
given discussions of Vasubandhu’s ideas elsewhere in the NV it is not unlikely 
that he did – is consistent with our reading, namely, they are intended to show 
that there is no conclusive inferential evidence for a self.50
It is, however, even more evident in his commentary on NS 3.1.1 that Uddyo-
takara considered one of the main Buddhist arguments against the existence of a 
self to be an argument from anupalabdhi.51 There, after dispatching the anumāna, 
“There is no self, because it has not arisen” (nāsty ātmājātatvāt), he takes up the 
argument, also apparently an anumāna for him, “There is no self, because it is 
not apprehended” (nāsty ātmānupalabdheḥ). Uddyotakara argues that the reason 
is not true: the soul is apprehended, for it is the object of the cognition “I”, which 
appears to be perceptual in nature. After defending this view (which was not 
shared by all Naiyāyikas) at some length he concludes,
Thus, to begin with, the self, being the object of the notion “I”, is perceptible. How the self 
is also apprehended by means of inference has been explained under the sūtra “Desire, 
etc.” [i.e., NS 1.1.10]. There is also scripture [that proves the existence of a self, viz. the 
Upaniṣads]. Thus, those three pramāṇas unitedly, insofar as they all refer to the same thing, 
prove the self. And there is no pramāṇa that gives rise to the opposite opinion. Hence, “be-
cause [the self] is not apprehended” is an unestablished reason.52
This seems to be directed against precisely the type of argument we analyzed 
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX as presenting. Therefore, we take it as support for our 
interpretation of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX.
a consideration in favor of the no-self view, though one can perhaps see him arguing in this way 
at Vś 7.
50 Cf. NVTh 389,12–13: The Buddhist says, na mayā kāryakāraṇabhāvāt pratisandhānaṃ sādhyate 
api tv anyathaiva tad bhavatīti hetor asiddhārthatādoṣo ’bhidhīyate. “It is not proven by me that 
memory is due to the relation of cause and effect [among only cognitions] but rather, [memory] is 
possible otherwise [than by postulating an ātman]. In this way, [your] reason is indicated as 
having the fault of unestablished meaning.”
51 See Taber 2012: 107–111.
52 NV 705,13–16: tad evam ahaṃpratyayaviṣayatvād ātmā tāvat pratyakṣaḥ, anumānenāpi yathā- 
tmoplabhyate tathoktam icchādisūtra iti. āgamo ’py asty eva. tāny etāni pramāṇāni trīṇy ekavi- 
ṣayatayā pratisandhīyamānāny ātmānaṃ pratipādayanti. na ca pramāṇāntaraṃ vipratipattihetur 
asti. tasmād anupalabdher ity asiddho hetuḥ. 
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This finding is strongly corroborated by the Yuktidīpikā. Prior to the discus-
sion of Sāṅkhyakārikā 17, which gives the reasons for the existence of the self, the 
author of the YD presents a Buddhist pūrvapakṣa that explicitly states that “there 
is no self, because it is not apprehendended by any pramāṇa.”53 Several (uniden-
tified) scriptural texts that also appear in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX are cited.54 
In the course of explaining how a self is not apprehended by perception, infer-
ence, or scripture the pūrvapakṣin affirms the general principle, “Here [in this 
context], that which exists is apprehended by one of the pramāṇas perception, 
etc., e.g., visible form”,55 upon which Vasubandhu’s argument from anupalabdhi 
appears to be based.
5 Arguments from ignorance in Indian philosophy
We have been talking about Vasubandhu’s argument against the existence of a 
self in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX as an argument ad ignorantiam, an argu-
ment which derives the non-existence of some entity from a lack of evidence for 
it, or, in other words, from its non-apprehension. Given how intuitive it is to at 
least seriously doubt the existence of something when it is not apprehended, it is 
not surprising that arguments to that effect left their traces in Indian philosophy 
already at a relatively early date. 
One of the driving forces behind the articulation of arguments from igno-
rance, and reflection on their probative force, was surely the controversial status 
of supersensible entities or phenomena which only some assumed to exist. The 
Carakasaṃhitā argues with materialists who deny rebirth on the grounds that it is 
not perceived; it lists in the process eight causes for the non-perception of things 
that are generally perceptible, including their being too far away or too close, the 
senses or the mind being damaged, or things being simply too subtle (ati- 
saukṣmya).56 In the Carakasaṃhitā the argument seems mainly to be driving at an 
epistemological point: Because there are many things which cannot be perceived 
at all, and because even things which can be perceived are sometimes not per-
ceived due to obstructing circumstances, it is unreasonable to claim that only that 
exists which is or can be perceived; hence one should not, as the materialists do, 
rely only on perception, but also consider other means of knowing the existence 
53 YD 168, 23–24: tasmāt sarvapramāṇānupalabdher nāsty ātmeti. 
54 YD 167,13–18.
55 YD 167,6–7: iha yad asti tat pratyakṣādinā pramāṇenoplabhyate tadyathā rūpādi.
56 See Carakasaṃhitā, sūtrasthāna 11.8, as well as MBh 2 197.8–11 (six causes, cf. Steinkellner 
1992: 402). For detailed discussion cf. Preisendanz 1994: 530ff. 
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of things.57 Yet, such lists of causes for non-perception also were taken to show 
why things exist in spite of their (occasional or even universal) imperceptibility. 
In the Sāṅkhyakārikā, challenges to the existence of the puruṣa and unmanifest 
prakṛti resulted in a list of causes for non-perception corresponding to that of 
the Carakasaṃhitā (SK 7); one can certainly see the focus on inference and on 
specific proofs for the existence of supersensible entities as reactions to similar 
challenges. 
But we have so far only cited defensive reactions against arguments from 
ignorance. Indeed, there seem to be not too many sources in which arguments 
from ignorance are actually propounded, although the few that we have been 
able to find might nevertheless have been historically influential. In Dignāga’s 
Nyāyamukha, the challenge to the Sāṅkhya supersensibles is condensed into the 
inference “primordial matter and the like do not exist because they are not appre-
hended.”58 But Dignāga seems to be only interested in this argument as far as one 
particular logical problem is concerned, namely that of stipulating something 
non-existent as the subject or property-bearer (sādhyadharmin) in an inference. 
Dignāga – and, following him, Dharmakīrti – addressed this by conceiving of the 
inferential subject as conceptualized, as simply the meaning of a word.59 
In the course of Nyāyasūtra 2.2.13–38, where the question of the eternality vs. 
non-eternality of sound is discussed, it is asserted by the Naiyāyika that sound 
does not exist prior to being uttered – therefore it must be brought into existence 
– “because it is not apprehended and no obstruction, etc., is apprehended 
[either];”60 hence it must not be eternal. Vātsyāyana introduces the sūtra by 
asking, “Moreover, how indeed is it known ‘This exists’, ‘This does not exist’? By 
apprehension and non-apprehension by means of a pramāṇa.”61 Here we see not 
only the formulation of a general principle, that non-existence is known through 
non-apprehension by a pramāṇa (or by pramāṇas), but also an awareness that an 
argument from ignorance must be qualified, if probative: to show that sound is 
absent one not only has to point to its non-apprehension, but also demonstrate 
that this non-apprehension is not caused by obstructions – we can take this to be 
57 Preisendanz 1994: 532. 
58 The Sanskrit text is cited by Dharmakīrti in PVSV 105,15ff.: na santi pradhānādayo ’nupa- 
labdheḥ. For the Chinese translation, see Katsura 1978: 110; English translation and discussion in 
Katsura 1992: 230. 
59 Cf. Yaita 1985: 7f., n. 3. For a discussion of more general philosophical problems cf. Vetter 
1968: 353f., and for further discussion of the logical problem involved, that of the fallacy of an 
unestablished basis (āśrayāsiddha), cf. Tillemans/Lopez 1998.
60 NS 2.2.18: prāg uccāraṇād anupalabdher āvaraṇādyanupalabdheś ca.
61 athāpi khalv idam asti idaṃ nāstīti kuta etat pratipattavyam iti. pramāṇata upalabdher 
anupalabdheś ca, NBh 614,2–3.
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in some measure a response to lists for causes of non-perception as given in the 
Carakasaṃhitā or in the Sāṅkhyakārikā. Near the beginning of the Nyāyabhāṣya, 
Vātsyāyana makes even more specific claims about the grounds on which some-
thing can be proclaimed as non-existent because it is not apprehended: the 
absence of a pramāṇa proves the non-existence only of such objects that, if they 
existed, would inevitably be apprehended62 – a line of thinking that will become 
central to Dharmakīrti’s complex theory of the “non-perception of a perceptible” 
(dṛśyānupalabdhi) as a separate type of reason in an inference. 
What we have detected in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is, on the other hand, 
not a simple inference, but rather a more involved procedure along the following 
lines: the apprehension of an entity by means of all sorts of pramāṇas is consid-
ered one by one; each pramāṇa fails to prove the entity in question, and hence it 
can be regarded as non-existent. Although this procedure is hardly made explicit, 
its elements are there. Our point, for now, is that Vasubandhu is certainly not the 
only, nor the first, Indian philosopher to consider the non-apprehension of a type 
of object as grounds for denying its existence; nevertheless, philosophers at his 
time had not yet thematized this kind of argument in the context of their theories 
of inference, or in their theories of pramāṇas more generally. 
It is intriguing to note that Kumārila, who stipulates absence as a separate 
pramāṇa, later makes use of the same procedure in what in fact seems to be the 
only application of absence as pramāṇa: he considers whether any of the other 
five pramāṇas establish a particular doctrine or entity, concludes that this is not 
the case, and from this concludes that it is an object of abhāvapramāṇa.63 
Kumārila applies this kind of reasoning to the doctrine that cognition is without 
an external objective basis (i.e., nirālambanavāda), the idea of smṛti as an author-
itative type of scripture, the assumption that the Vedas have an author (kartṛ), 
and the idea that human beings can be omniscient.64 
Dharmakīrti’s immediate predecessor, Īśvarasena, apparently held anupa- 
labdhi to be a third pramāṇa to stand alongside perception and inference, but 
given that his works are not preserved, it is uncertain what he thought to be 
its sphere of application, and whether he also envisioned this kind of procedure 
to be connected with anupalabdhi.65 Dharmakīrti specifies anupalabdhi as a 
62 NBhTh 1,16–20, translated in Kellner 1997:59f.
63 Connections between this pattern and the argument pattern known as pariśeṣa, an argument 
which establishes something by excluding what are to be believed all other options, are not 
unlikely. 
64 Kellner 1996 : 149f.
65 See Steinkellner 1979: 48, n. 123 and Katsura 1992. According to accounts of Īśvarasena’s 
views that are given in later commentaries on Dharmakīrti’s works (for a list of known passages, 
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separate type of logical reason in an inference, but in so doing effectively limits 
its scope so that it cannot prove the non-existence (that is, unreality) of whole 
types of things. Understood specifically as the non-occurrence of perception,66 
anupalabdhi can only prove that things that are not perceived in a situation where 
their perception, if they existed, would be inevitable, can be cognitively, linguis-
tically and physically treated as non-existent.67 But the non-apprehension of 
things without any further qualification is not evidence for their absence; non- 
apprehension in this sense only yields the absence of its treatment as existent, 
because to treat something as existent presupposes its apprehension.68 Subjec-
tively, however, when someone does not apprehend a thing it means that for him 
the object is as good as non-existent.69 
But Dharmakīrti also discusses what basically seems to be an argument 
from ignorance: one that allegedly proves the non-existence of “remote” objects 
(viprakṛṣṭa) on the ground that they are not apprehended by any of the three in-
struments of knowledge, perception, inference, and scripture.70 He does not con-
sider this kind of argument to be sound. The absence of a scriptural statement 
proving the existence of something does not prove the non-existence of that 
thing, since scripture is of a specific kind: it teaches what is relevant for attaining 
a particular purpose. There are many things that are irrelevant to that purpose, 
cf. Kellner 1997: 107, n. 166) he held that the negative concomitance (vyatireka) in an inference is 
determined by a mere non-perception (adarśanamātra) of the reason where the inferred property 
is absent, and he also advocated anupalabdhi as a third pramāṇa and understood it as the “mere 
absence of apprehension” (upalabdhyabhāvamātra). But the connection between these two as-
signed views is not entirely clear from the accounts known so far. 
66 Or, more precisely according to the Hetubindu, as the occurrence of another perception. 
67 Dharmakīrti’s point that non-perception does not prove a thing’s absence, but rather justifies 
treating it as absent (asadvyavahāra), simply means that the absence of a thing no longer needs 
to be proven when its perception is known to be absent (in a situation where all conditions for its 
perception are met); cf. Kellner 1999. In the same way, that a Śiṃśapā is a tree is not in need of 
proof when the Śiṃśapā is seen; it is only corresponding cognitive, linguistic, and physical prac-
tice – vyavahāra – toward the Śiṃśapā as a tree that is then the subject of an inference based on 
the reason of essential property (svabhāvahetu). 
68 PV 1.2–3ab=4–5ab (Kellner 2003: 125ff.).
69 PVSV ad PV 1.198=200. 
70 PVSV ad PV 1.199=201; PVin 2, p. 62. This continues the discussion of v. 32cd, which begins on 
the preceding page. Steinkellner 1979: 82, n. 186 regards this to be a rhetorical position because 
no tradition of Dharmakīrti’s time advocated three pramāṇas. This is not entirely true, for the 
Sāṅkhya advocates precisely these three pramāṇas, as do some Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda thinkers, 
including Vasubandhu. We are not aware, however, of any Sāṅkhya philosopher to advocate a 
proof that entities do not exist because none of the three pramāṇas establish them. If our argu-
ment that Vasubandhu did pursue such an argument is judged convincing, then Dharmakīrti 
could here well construe the position he refutes on the basis of Vasubandhu. 
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and these are simply outside the reach of scripture. If they are not mentioned in 
it, surely this does not prove they don’t exist. 
Second, as remote objects lack the capacity to produce a cognition of them-
selves, they are not of the kind that their effects – cognitions – could be observed 
as evidence for their existence. One can therefore also not conclude that they do 
not exist when they are not known by any of the three pramāṇas,71 for they might 
exist without giving rise to a cognition of themselves. Non-apprehension in gen-
eral is therefore – strictly speaking72 – not a pramāṇa at all, since it does not 
result in ascertainment (niścaya) or certainty (vyavasāya). It can negate treating 
something as existent, but it does not provide certainty in this regard, only 
doubt.73 This means that people can act on its basis – for there can also be action 
based on doubtful cognitions – but it is still not a pramāṇa.74 In the Pramāṇa-
viniścaya, Dharmakīrti adds another argument that concerns the scope of non- 
apprehension. A general non-apprehension by all persons cannot establish 
anything because such a general apprehension is not known to oneself, nor is it 
known to anyone else. It is only one’s own non-apprehension of an object that 
one knows. Such a non-apprehension may apply to remote objects – I do not 
apprehend a fire that might be burning behind a mountain – but it is not the case 
that these then do not exist at all.75
Dharmakīrti’s description of an argument from ignorance that allegedly 
proves the non-existence of remote objects seems to coincide with the under-
standing of the Buddhist argument for no-self implied by Uddyotakara’s sum-
mary of his refutation of it, which we have quoted above: “Thus, it is found that 
all three pramāṇas” – i.e., perception, inference, and scripture – “establish the 
existence of the self […]. Hence, the premise ‘because the self is not-apprehended’ 
is absolutely untrue.” 
The consequences of Dharmakīrti’s elimination of arguments from ignorance 
from his theory of inference remain to be assessed. It does not seem to have 
affected the perception of Buddhist arguments against the existence of a self 
greatly, for these continue to be interpreted as arguments from anupalabdhi by 
71 PVSV 102,1–12. 
72 Kellner 2003: 134. 
73 See also NB 2.27 as well as 47–48 (mentioning only perception and inference; Kellner 1999: 
195), also VN 5,21–23 and 10,9–20.
74 PVSV ad PV 1.200ab=202ab. For adṛśyānupalabdhi as a proper reason in Tibetan interpreta-
tions cf. Tillemans 1995; for the argument that Dharmakīrti’s two claims (a) unqualified non- 
apprehension negates treating something as existent and (b) unqualified non-apprehension is 
not a pramāṇa (in the sense of not a proper reason) indicate that Dharmakīrti was working out 
just what anupalabdhi could explain, see Kellner 2003. 
75 PVin 2 64,12–14.
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later Brahminical writers, e.g., Udayana,76 Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha,77 and Utpalade-
va.78 Even in later Buddhist texts, e.g., the Tattvasaṅgraha, the strategy for argu-
ing against the existence of a self is chiefly to show that there is no evidence, 
either perceptual or inferential, that establishes it.79 But Dharmakīrti himself 
does not argue along these lines. In the scattered passages where he discusses 
Brahminical arguments for the existence of a self he primarily considers them as 
illustrations of the violation of various logical principles. The Nyāya argument 
“This living body is not without a self because [if it were,] it would follow that it 
would not have breath”, e.g., is the kind of fallacy that would be allowed if the 
vyatireka could be established by “mere non-observation.”80 In the course of his 
rejection of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika attempts to infer the self as the agent of phenomena 
such as breathing or the substratum of mental states – for being imperceptible, 
Dharmakīrti points out, one could never establish a causal relationship between 
the self and other things – he does note that the Buddhist (typically?) denies the 
self on the grounds that it is unperceived.81 But Dharmakīrti himself does not 
adopt such a strategy. Rather, he develops an interesting pragmatic argument in 
PV 2.220–256: Because a self is necessarily an object of attachment, any belief in 
a self (even as “pure” and disassociated from body, mind, senses, etc.) will pre-
vent liberation.82
With the construction and elaboration of complex systems of pramāṇas, one 
might expect arguments from ignorance that make use of a pramāṇa framework 
to also increase considerably in complexity. They have to our knowledge not been 
addressed in any one particular study. This may be because studies on Indian 
logic have focused on the atomic inference structures which form the core of the 
theory of anumāna, leaving aside patterns and strategies of argumentation that, 
for reasons that remain to be investigated, were not subsumed under the rubric of 
a particular pramāṇa, or a particular type of reasoning and inference explicitly 
stipulated within some classification.83
76 ĀTV 739ff. [Anupalambhavāda].
77 Watson 2006: 126–130.
78 As explained by Abhinavagupta; cf. Ratié 2011: 45–51.
79 See Tattvasaṅgraha 220 (concluding the discussion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments) and 
283–284 (concluding the discussion of the Mīmāṃsā view that the self is the referent of the 
notion “I”). 
80 See Eltschinger/Ratié 2013: 117–138. 
81 PVSV 16,17–19; see Eltschinger/Ratié 2013: 147–151. 
82 See Eltschinger/Ratié 2013: 187ff. Cf. again the opening lines of AKBh IX cited above, n. 38.
83 Hugon’s discovery of a pattern of what she calls “argument by parallels” in the works of the 
Tibetan epistemologist Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge is an example of the rich harvest that a focus on 
argumentation patterns might yield, also for Indian sources (Hugon 2008). 
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But is this type of argument a fallacy? Usually, in modern logic textbooks, this 
kind of argument is considered a fallacy. Its general form has been analyzed as 
follows: A is not known (proved) to be true (false), therefore A is false (true).84 
Arguments of this type were used to great effect by Senator Joe McCarthy in the 
Senate Un-American Activities hearings in the early 1950’s: “Mr. X is not known 
not to be a Communist, therefore Mr. X is a Communist.” Yet they are also used, 
legitimately it would seem, in scientific research. When scientists systematically 
conduct experiments to detect a certain phenomenon – e.g., the lumeniferous 
aether that was once postulated as the medium for the propagation of light – but 
do not find it, they conclude that it does not exist. It would seem that the argu-
mentum ad ignorantiam is a reasonable argument where it functions as a strong 
abductive argument, i.e., an “argument to the best explanation”: under certain 
circumstances, the non-existence of something provides the best explanation why 
there is no evidence for it. In that case, one may be allowed to presume, though 
not assert, that it does not exist. In such circumstances, one could maintain that 
the fact that there is no evidence for P is evidence that not-P. Scientists often refer 
to such absence of evidence as “negative evidence.” 
Philosophers have also used arguments from ignorance convincingly, e.g., to 
claim that God does not exist.85 We also often employ such arguments in com-
monsense reasoning, e.g., to assert that there are no ghosts, no UFO’s, no Santa 
Claus, etc. But whether such arguments are regarded as convincing depends on 
whether there are agreed-upon standards of verification. It is very difficult to 
know what would count as good evidence for or against the existence of such 
things as UFOs, whereas the affirmation or denial of lumeniferous aether relies on 
established scientific methods. The argument that UFOs do not exist because we 
do not know or observe them to exist may be fallacious simply because UFOs 
raise specific problems regarding the nature of evidence and verification.86 Not 
only in the case of UFOs, but more generally, debates about arguments from igno-
rance typically come to focus on the question just what it is that could count as 
evidence for the existence of objects – after all, one might believe that there is no 
evidence for something simply because one was looking for the wrong kind of 
84 Walton 1999: 368.
85 See Flew 1955. In this classic article Flew argues that unless the falsification of some factual 
statement counts decisively against the existence of God, then the hypothesis “God exists” loses 
all meaning. Theists may always come up with some explanation why there is, in a given in-
stance, no evidence of God when it would be expected, but then the hypothesis undergoes 
“death by a thousand qualifications.” This appeals implicitly to an argumentum ad ignorantiam: 
unless one accepts that the absence of evidence establishes that God does not exist, one’s belief 
in God is without any content.
86 Walton 1999: 368f. 
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evidence, or because one failed to consider something as evidence that should be 
counted as such. Clearly, when Vātsyāyana or Dharmakīrti introduce restrictions 
to the effect that non-apprehension proves the absence of something only if the 
thing in question would have to be be apprehended were it to exist, they effec-
tively aim to narrow down conditions for what counts as evidence for existence. 
The upshot of Dharmakīrti’s train of thought, however, seems to be that argu-
ments from ignorance can never be convincing because the only kind of evidence 
for existence, perception, can be lacking only temporarily. 
In the next section, then, we shall offer our new reading of the Viṃśikā, and 
in the process also bring out parallels between Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX and 
the Viṃśikā. We believe that this will show that Vasubandhu is arguing along the 
same lines in both works, by means of an argument from ignorance, against the 
existence of a self in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, and against the existence of 
objects outside of consciousness in the Viṃśikā.
6 A new reading of the  Viṃśikā 
In spite of its importance and availability in modern translations the Viṃśikā has 
been a relatively neglected text. There exist a few studies of it, to be sure, which 
mainly focus on vv. 11–15, seen as presenting Vasubandhu’s core arguments.87 
Only Kochumuttom’s study attempts to analyze the entire text in depth.88 There 
seems to be a tendency on the part of scholars to assume that one knows what it 
means. Yet the text contains many subtleties that have never been noticed, let 
alone discussed. We, too, cannot offer a complete, in-depth analysis of the text, 
but we hope, at the very least, to reawaken an interest in it by calling attention to 
some of its overlooked nuances.
The Viṃśikā begins with the assertion, “In Mahāyāna it is established that 
the world consisting of the three realms is mere cognition (vijñaptimātra)”, fol-
lowed by a citation from the Daśabhūmikasūtra: “Oh Sons of the Conqueror, mere 
mind (cittamātra) is this world consisting of the three realms indeed.”89 Although 
87 The most in-depth studies of this type are Kapstein 1988 and Oetke 1992. According to Frau-
wallner (2010: 385) vv. 11–15 comprise “the actual centerpiece of the presentation […] Vasuban- 
dhu’s own proof of the unreality of the external world.” 
88 Kochumuttom 1982: 164–196. Cf. also Schmithausen 1967. Though amazingly rich, this study 
is from the point of view of a rather specific Problemstellung. For other studies, which also in-
clude translations, see Lévi 1932, Frauwallner 2010: 381–411, and Wood 1991: 93–105, 163–170. 
89 VśV 3,2f.: mahāyāne traidhātukaṃ vijñaptimātraṃ vyavasthāpyate. cittamātraṃ bho jina- 
putrā yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtrāt. See Lévi 1932: 43, n. 1, for sources of the quotation. Cf. 
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the term vijñapti can be used both for an epistemic act or event – a cognition that 
makes something conscious or brings it to mind – as well as for the content of that 
cognition (what Hayes and Hall refer to as “percept” or “phenomenon”), Vasu-
bandhu seems to lean towards the event-aspect in the Viṃśikā, for he states right 
after this citation that the word citta which is used in it is synonymous with 
manas, vijñāna, and vijñapti.90 The word mātra, “mere” or “only”, is “for the pur-
pose of denying an object” (arthapratiṣedhārtham). We then have the following 
verse in the Lévi edition:
This is mere cognition indeed (eva), because of the appearance of non-existent objects, like 
the seeing of non-existent hairs by someone afflicted by floaters.91
Independently of each other, Harada Wasō and Jürgen Hanneder convincingly 
argued that this verse, which is missing from the Tibetan translations and from 
Xuanzang’s Chinese translation but corresponds to prose passages in both, may 
actually have been fashioned from a prose statement of the Vṛtti when a kārikā-
only text was composed,92 for on that occasion it would have become obvious 
that otherwise the work would abruptly begin with an objection (as stated by the 
second verse of Lévi’s edition). In other words, what is now the second verse of 
Lévi’s edition might originally have been the first verse, and what is now the first 
Daśabhūmikasūtra 49,10: cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam. Schmithausen 1973: 172f. 
discusses this passage in connection with the development of the vijñaptimātratā doctrine. 
90 Schmithausen 2007: 213, n. 2 suggests the translation “representation”, which was also 
adopted in Yamabe 1998 (without discussion). In Schmithausen’s view, “representation” is not 
only noncomittal as regards the act-/event- or content-distinction, but it also has the advantage 
of not precluding subconscious mental processes and their contents that are also at times in-
tended by vijñapti. But as Hall (1986: 14; see above p. 712) also pointed out, “representation” risks 
being associated, in philosophical contexts, with the position of representationalism that as-
sumes mental states to be (or contain) representations of an independent, external reality. This 
is not a position to which Vasubandhu subscribes in the Viṃśikā. Moreover, there is no occur- 
rence of vijñapti in Vś(V) which unambiguously refers to cognitive content; most occurrences 
unmistakably refer to cognitive acts or events, and subconscious mental processes and their con-
tents are not topical in the Vś(V). We therefore translate “cognition.” This forces us to translate 
vijñāna, jñāna, buddhi, and vijñapti with the same word, but in the Viṃśikā they indeed seem to 
express the same concept. 
91 v. 1: vijñaptimātram evedam asadarthāvabhāsanāt / yadvat taimirakasyāsatkeśoṇḍukādidar- 
śanam // This is the text according to the Nepalese kārikā manuscript Vś-ms-A 3a5. For variant 
readings cf. the overview in Hanneder 2007: 213, and also the earlier discussions in Funahashi 
1986 and Harada 2003. For the identification of the timira disease as floaters (or muscae voli-
tantes) see Chu 2004: 131, n. 67 (reporting an idea by Anne Macdonald). 
92 Harada 2003, Hanneder 2007. 
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verse of Lévi’s edition might have been fashioned out of a sentence (or a couple of 
sentences) of the introductory portion of the commentary.93 
Be all that as it may, whether this first statement was originally a stand-alone 
verse or, in somewhat different wording, part of the commentary, it does not 
appear that it intends to present a formal anumāna that would establish the char-
acter of “this” as “mere cognition” by citing a hetu that consists in some property 
that is invariably connected with being “mere cognition”, as proper anumānas 
should.94 Rather, it simply mentions another fact in support of the claim that 
“this” is mere cognition, namely, that we sometimes have cognitions of objects 
that do not exist. The idea seems to be – given the lack of information provided by 
the text, we have to speculate – that all of our cognitions are structurally indistin-
guishable from ones in which were are presented with non-existent objects. 
Therefore, we are justified in regarding all cognition in the same way, as mere 
cognition without an object. Now, since this is so weak an argument as not to be 
considered really an argument at all, it seems most appropriate to interpret this 
initial statement not as any kind of proof, but rather simply as a statement of the 
thesis to be proved in the treatise to follow, together with a prima facie rationale 
93 Corresponding to rnam par śes pa ’di ñid don du snaṅ ba ’byuṅ ste / dper na rab rib can rnams 
kyis skra zla la sogs pa med par mthoṅ ba bzin te / in the Tibetan translation (quoted after La 
Vallée Poussin 1912: 54). 
94 Responding to arguments along these lines presented in Taber 1994, Kobayashi 2011 provides 
an interpretation of this verse where it presents a formal anumāna. He achieves this by constru-
ing the reason in a way that it is a property of the subject and thus fulfils the pakṣadharmatā 
condition (“because [this world] appears as an unreal object”, not the more intuitive “because 
unreal objects appear”), and by interpreting -darśana in the example not as the act of seeing, 
but (by way of karmavyutpatti) as what is seen (“just like what is seen by one who suffers from 
an eye disease, such as an unreal hair-net”). But while these interpretive moves do achieve 
a formal anumāna, they do not provide the most straightforward reading of the verse. Moreover, 
by adjusting the translation of the verse in this way, Kobayashi is able to argue that it was the 
“prototype” for an anumāna that was cited by Brahminical and Madhyamaka philosophers in 
attacking the mere-cognition doctrine and also defended by later Buddhist pramāṇa philoso-
phers (e.g., Jñānaśrīmitra and Prajñākaragupta), namely (in Prajñākara’s formulation): “All cog-
nitions [in waking states] have no external objects, because they are cognitions, just like a dream 
cognition” (Kobayashi 2011: 299; he discusses other formulations in the article). Assimilating 
Vasubandhu’s argument to this anumāna, however, makes it prey to obvious, prima facie formal 
objections, such as were raised by the first Brahminical philosophers in critiquing the anumāna 
(Uddyotakara and Kumārila; see Taber 1994), without any indication of how they are to be an-
swered. Thus we also feel that Kobayashi in the end proposes a less charitable reading of the 
Viṃśikā than ours.
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for it. The actual proof of the thesis, as we shall see, will be of a much less direct 
nature.95
But is the Viṃśikā even intended to establish this thesis, or is it simply a de-
fense of it against objections? Frauwallner seems to have taken it as the former,96 
but an influential interpretation of the text sees it as the latter. Thus, S. Lévi:
Le premier traité, en vingt vers (Viṁśikā ou Viṁśatikā), est une sorte d’introduction au sys-
tème, plutôt critique que constructive. Vasubandhu, avant d’exposer en détail sa propre 
doctrine de l’idéalisme absolu, s’attache à réfuter les objections de principe qu’on peut lui 
opposer à l’intérieur de l’église bouddhique elle-même; puis il s’attaque à la théorie ato- 
mique des Vaiśeṣikas, l’interprétation physique de l’univers la plus puissante que le génie 
hindou ait élaborée, et qui s’était insinuée dans le bouddhisme, jusque chez ces Vaibhāṣi-
kas du Cachemire que Vasubandhu avait longtemps suivis avec sympathie. Sa critique de 
l’atome, où s’affirme la vigueur de sa dialectique, est restée classique pendant des siècles. 
L’atome mis hors de cause, ce n’est plus qu’un jeu pour lui de montrer les insuffisances de la 
thèse matérialiste en général, tandis que les données en apparence les plus réfractaires à la 
thèse idéaliste, la mémoire, le rêve, la mort, s’intègrent sans difficulté dans ce système.97
And D. Shimaji notes, in his “Historique du système vijñaptimātra”, contained in 
the same volume, that the second patriarch of the Chinese vijñaptimātratā school, 
Hui Zhao, calls, in his commentary on the Cheng weishi lun, the Viṃśikā “the trea-
tise demolishing the mountain of heresy” and the Triṃśikā “the treatise raising 
95 Cf. other recent attempts to construe the first verse as a valid syllogism by Feldman 2005 and 
Mills 2013: chapter 2. Mills, building on Feldman’s formulation, argues that the verse presents a 
stronger argument if it is taken as an argument for phenomenalism rather than idealism. One 
could, for instance, see it as anticipating A. J. Ayer’s famous Argument from Illusion for sense 
data (this, however, is not how Mills analyzes it): Because it is (allegedly) always possible that I 
am experiencing a hallucination or illusion, whenever I perceive something, it remains an open 
question whether I am perceiving an existing physical object or not. Therefore, what I am per-
ceiving whenever I perceive something is something other than a physical object – a sense datum 
(cf. Ayer 1956: 104–115). The purpose of the discussion of Vś 2–7, then, would be to show that it is 
indeed possible that the experiences I am having could be hallucinations or illusions, i.e., un-
caused by external objects. (Therefore, once again, even assuming that they are caused by physi-
cal objects, we are not experiencing physical objects directly, but rather “sense data.”) We do not 
think there is any consideration that decisively rules out a phenomenalistic interpretation of the 
verse if it is considered in isolation, but our point is that an idealist interpretation makes better 
sense considering the Viṃśikā as a whole.
96 Frauwallner 2010: 381: “I now move on to the discussion of the Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. 
The doctrine of the unreality of the external world originally emerged directly from the experi-
ence of meditation. As proof, one was content to point to dreams, sensory illusions, mirages, and 
so forth. Accordingly, Vasubandhu begins [v. 1] by stating the tenet with a reference to the sacred 
scripture and by referring to these examples.”
97 Lévi 1932: 7.
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the banner of the Dharma.”98 We consider this a plausible reading of the text as 
far as it goes,99 which is not inconsistent with ours and which does justice, in 
particular, to the wealth of references to Buddhist theories and concepts that it 
contains. Certainly, the Viṃśikā is not a purely philosophical treatise that can be 
completely taken out of its religious context. However, we believe that, in light of 
the understanding of the argumentative structure that we are about to work out, 
the text can also be seen as taking a much stronger dialectical stand – namely, it 
is an attempt to establish the thesis of vijñaptimātratā, not merely to defend it 
against objections – which was probably not lost on its readers, both within and 
outside the Buddhist community.
The second verse, then, immediately expresses an objection to this thesis, 
which we now paraphrase with the help of the autocommentary: If cognition 
does not arise from the object (vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ), then how is there a “re-
striction” (niyama) of cognitions to certain times and places? How is there “a 
non-restriction of the [cognition] series” (santānasyāniyamaḥ), that is to say, how 
is it that some cognitions arise for “everyone situated in those times and places” 
(taddeśakālapratiṣṭhitānāṃ sarveṣām)? Finally, why do things like food or drink 
experienced in waking cognitions produce the effects that can be expected of 
them (kṛtyakriyā),100 whereas the same objects do not produce these effects when 
we experience them in dreams? None of these facts about our experience seems 
possible if we were not cognizing physical objects, which indeed are the sorts of 
things that would be restricted to certain times and places, yet which would be 
intersubjectively available to all who are present at those times and places and 
would produce real effects, unlike dream images.
In the famous passage that follows (vv. 3–7) Vasubandhu explains away these 
facts about our experience by appealing to the phenomena of dreams and the 
experiences in the hells that Buddhist doctrine envisions. In dreams, he notes, 
one sees things that appear to be confined to particular times and places, without 
an external object (v. 3ab’); in other words, dreams are just as spatially and tem-
porally specific as waking experiences. Due to the same maturation of their 
deeds, the spirits of the dead ( preta), plagued by hunger and thirst, all see rivers 
of water as filled with pus and excrement, overseen by frightening guardians 
(v. 3b’d). Moreover, in dreams we also experience the effects of the things we see 
– he cites the example of a nocturnal pollution (v. 4ab’). But it is by experiences 
98 Lévi 1932: 16.
99 It does overlook the last verse of the text, in which Vasubandhu says, “This establishing of 
mere-cognition has been carried out by me according to my abilities”, vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ 
svaśaktisadṛśī mayā / kṛteyam, v. 22ac’.
100 More literally: “production of what is to be produced.” 
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in the hells that all the phenomena which the opponent raises as problems are 
exemplified (v. 4b’c’). The guardians in the hells, along with horrible birds and 
dogs and moving mountains of iron, are seen in certain places at certain times – 
and they are seen by all living beings reborn in the hells, not just by a single one. 
And these guardians inflict pain on the denizens of the hells, and hence produce 
effects (v. 4c’d). Yet none of these things, the rivers of pus, the guardians, and the 
other awful creatures of hell, really exist, but they are experienced by the deni-
zens of hell in these particular ways “due to the influence of the same ripening of 
the[ir individual] deeds” (samānakarmavipākādhipatya). Thus, it is possible for 
“this” world, too, to consist of objects that are restricted in regard to time and 
place, intersubjectively available, and causally efficacious, and yet also be “mere 
cognition.”
There are many things about this first section of the text, consisting of vv. 1–7, 
that merit discussion. One of the most interesting aspects of the passage for our 
purposes is how Vasubandhu approaches the existence of the hell guardians. 
Some Buddhist schools such as the Mahāsāṅghikas and Sāṃmitīyas believed 
these to be real living beings.101 But, as Vasubandhu argues at first, taking on the 
position of the Sarvāstivāda school, just like the horrible dogs and birds that 
appear to the hell denizens, the hell guardians cannot be living beings because 
they do not experience the pain that living beings reborn in the hells inevitably 
feel.102 Rather, the past deeds of the hell denizens, when they come to fruition, 
give rise to103 particular forms of matter (bhūtaviśeṣa) that undergo a transforma-
tion ( pariṇāma), also under the influence of the denizens’ karman, and as a result 
appear as making threatening gestures. The same mechanism also explains the 
moving mountains and other forms of frightening movement seen in the hells. 
101 For different positions on the hell guardians see AKBh 164,11–19 ad AK 3.58. Doctrinal posi-
tions are listed in La Vallée Poussin 1926: 152, n. 3, on the basis of the Vibhāṣā and a commentary 
on the Viṃśikā, most likely Kuiji’s commentary on Xuanzang’s translation that was also used in 
Hamilton 1938. Cf. also Lévi 1932: 47, n. 1, Frauwallner 2010: 383. 
102 VśV 4,18–24 (with further arguments). 
103 The Sanskrit at VśV 5,1 reads nārakāṇāṃ karmabhis tatra bhūtaviśeṣāḥ sambhavanti. The 
phrase is later taken up in v. 6: yadi tatkarmabhis tatra bhūtānāṃ sambhavaḥ … According to 
Frauwallner’s summary (2010: 383), the Sarvāstivādins assume that the hell guardians are not 
sentient beings, but material formations. The karman of the hell denizens then makes these 
formations appear as guardians. The text, however, rather suggests that the karman actually 
produces these formations and thus interferes in material causality; it does not just distort the 
cognition of hell denizens. In AKBh 164,14f., what is arguably the same Sarvāstivāda view is 
presented as sattvānāṃ karmabhir (sc. narakapālāḥ) vivartanīvāyubījavat (or, with AKVy 327,3f., 
vāyuvat): the hell guardians arise from the karman of living beings, just like the winds – also 
driven by karman – move to create the receptacle world. 
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Hence, it is not true that hell guardians and other forms of moving matter do not 
arise (sambhavanti) at all; it is only that they arise through the ripened karman of 
those living beings that experience them (VśV v. 5). Vasubandhu next criticizes 
this (Sarvāstivāda) position: If it is assumed that the hell guardians arise in the 
hells through the force of karman, why not simply grant that cognition itself 
transforms in such a way, that is, into images of hell guardians? Why assume that 
material elements are being produced? (v. 6) In other words, one might just as 
well opt for a wholly mind-based explanation; nothing forces us to stipulate a 
causal influence of mind (mental traces of karman) on matter. Surely, with this 
argument Vasubandhu is not merely bracketing the physical existence of hell 
guardians; he flatly denies it, for the same reason that we would argue he denies 
external, physical objects of cognition: there is no evidence for them. 
Taken together, the first section of the Vś (vv. 1–7) has on our interpretation 
for its main point to show that nothing requires us to postulate external objects in 
order to account for certain facts about our experience. The non-existence of 
physical objects is on our interpretation implied by some of Vasubandhu’s argu-
ments – notably, the analogy with the hells – but it is subservient to the larger 
issue that reason cannot establish the existence of physical objects. For any proof 
of physical objects would demand that there is evidence for their existence – and 
this evidence would be all the more convincing if it made their existence neces-
sary, if it could not be explained otherwise with equal cogency. The kind of rea-
soning which would serve Vasubandhu best if he really wanted to deny the exis-
tence of external objects – short of conclusively proving that they are impossible104 
– is, in other words, of the nature of (non-deductive) inference to the best expla-
nation for the lack of evidence for their existence, and not deductive inference. 
But we saw precisely this kind of reasoning at work in AKBh IX. The strategy of 
this section of the Viṃśikā is in fact identical to the strategy of the last part of 
AKBh IX (472,16–478,13, discussed above p. 724), where Vasubandhu shows that 
there are no reasons to postulate a self. Similarly, in Viṃśikā vv. 1–7, the main 
point is arguably that there are no reasons to postulate external objects of per- 
ception, as a number of facts that are usually explained by them can also be 
accounted for through mere-cognition. Thus, one may see this part of the text as 
the first stage of an argument from ignorance; namely, none of the three accepted 
pramāṇas, inference, scripture, or perception, attests to the existence of such 
objects, therefore they do not exist and all “this” is mere cognition.
The first section ends with a question: Why would one suppose that the im-
pressions (vāsanā) of karman exist in one place, namely, in the cognition series of 
104 Which Vasubandhu probably thought could not be done. See p. 743, below.
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the agent of the karman, and its fruit in another, namely, in a place called hell? 
Why would one not suppose that the fruition of karman occurs where the vāsanā 
is located, i.e., in the mind itself (v. 7)? To this question, which puts forward yet 
another argument against the Sarvāstivāda account of the hell guardians, Vasu-
bandhu has his interlocutor answer: 
Scripture is the reason. If mere cognition had the appearance of visible form, etc., then there 
would be no visible form, and so forth, as object. [And] then the Blessed One would not have 
declared the existence of the āyatanas visible form, etc.105 
In other words, it is the Buddha’s teaching of the āyatanas or sense-spheres, 
which includes the sense-faculties and their objects, that establishes the exis-
tence of physical objects, including the guardians of hell, outside the series of 
mental cognitions, i.e., outside the mind. It is the word of the Buddha, scripture, 
that essentially provides evidence for the existence of objects.
In the following verses, vv. 8–15, Vasubandhu sets aside this objection, and 
hence also the idea that scripture provides evidence for the existence of objects. 
This would, then, be the second stage of his argument from ignorance. The 
Buddha did not affirm the existence of the āyatanas as his final position, Vasu-
bandhu maintains. Rather, he mentioned them “on account of an intention 
(abhiprāya) concerning the people to be instructed by that [teaching].” (v. 8bc) 
What was his intention? To show that there is no self but just factors (dharma) 
and their causes, in a word, to demonstrate that the person is without essence 
( pudgalanairātmya, v. 10ab’). Specifically, all cognitions involve the appearance 
(ābhāsa) of a certain form “due to a seed which has attained a particular trans- 
formation” (svabījāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaprāptāt) within the mental series itself.106 
That seed and that appearance are referred to as the sense-faculty and the object, 
respectively (v. 9). Ultimately, however, the Buddha will teach that the factors 
themselves are without essence (dharmanairātmya): there really aren’t any 
dharmas that have the nature of visible form, etc. And that is to be accomplished 
by the teaching that all is “mere cognition.” (v. 10b’)
How does one know that the Buddha “taught the sense-spheres with this 
intention, and that these things which are individually the objects of vision, etc., 
do not exist?” Here, in vv. 11–15, Vasubandhu develops his famous proof of the 
impossibility of physical objects of perception. As this passage has already been 
analyzed by several scholars, and their disagreements do not affect our main 
105 VśV 5,15–17.
106 For the nuances of the concept of “transformation” ( pariṇāma) in the Vś(V) see Schmit-
hausen 1967: 115.
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line of interpretation, it is not necessary for us to go into details here.107 Suffice 
it to say that in v. 11 Vasubandhu gives what would appear to be an exhaustive 
enumeration of all the ways in which physical objects might exist and rejects each 
one of them. The āyatana which serves as the object (viṣaya) cannot be “one”, 
i.e., the whole of the Vaiśeṣika. Nor can it be “many according to atoms” (anekam 
[…] paramāṇuśaḥ), i.e., many atoms, each of which is perceived individually. Nor, 
finally, can it be “aggregated” (saṃhatāḥ) atoms (v. 11). He then proceeds, in the 
following verses, to show why each of these positions is untenable.
After demolishing the idea that the object is “one”, i.e., an undivided whole, 
in v. 15, Vasubandhu concludes that a division into atoms is necessary (VśV 8,18–
20); yet he has already shown (v. 12ab, 14ab) that the notion of an atom “as a 
single substance” is not established (VśV 7,1–2). Having thus exhausted the last 
hope of making sense of an object of cognition, Vasubandhu concludes, in his 
autocommentary to v. 15:
That [single atom] not being established, it is not established that visible form, etc., are ob-
jects of vision, etc. And so (iti) it results (bhavati) that mere cognition is established.
It would appear from this statement that Vasubandhu thinks that the argument of 
the āyatana section against the possibility of objects indeed establishes that there 
are no physical objects, hence that “this” world is mere cognition. Once again, 
while the advocate of the phenomenalist interpretation could point out that one 
need only take the passage to be arguing that there are no “material bodies” or 
“concrete particulars” that we are directly experiencing (cf. Oetke 1992), we are 
proposing, for now, as a hypothesis that it is arguing that such objects do not 
exist. In the end, we believe that this hypothesis makes better sense of the Viṃśikā 
overall.
Yet Vasubandhu now has his interlocutor object (VśV 8,21–23):
Whether something exists or not is ascertained on account of the pramāṇas. Since percep-
tion is the most authoritative of the pramāṇas, if the object does not exist, how does the 
cognition arise that something was perceived? 
We interpret the meaning of this interesting transitional passage between what 
we take to be the second and third sections of the treatise in the following way. As 
announced in v. 8, the section up to v. 15 refutes the idea that scripture offers evi-
dence for objects, by pointing out that the Buddha’s mention of the sense-spheres 
is to be understood in such a way that these do not exist as external and physical 
107 See especially Kapstein 1988 and Oetke 1992 for precise reconstructions of this section. 
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objects. The arguments in vv. 11–15 undermine scripture as evidence for objects in 
essentially the same way Vasubandhu’s arguments against the pudgala in his 
AKBh IX undermine the idea that there is scriptural evidence for the existence of 
a self, namely, by showing that the Buddha could not have taught such a thing 
because however one conceives of it, it is absurd.108 
But Vasubandhu now points out that the evidence of perception, which has 
greater weight than that of the other pramāṇas, including inference treated in vv. 
1–7, seems to establish the existence of objects directly. Therefore, any attempted 
demonstration of the impossibility of objects will be inconclusive and trumped by 
perception. If the preceding section had the “proof” of the non-existence of an 
external world for its main purpose, that would make the entire rest of the treatise 
superfluous. In fact, it is in this short transitional statement where Vasubandhu 
enunciates the principle that we believe governs his entire discussion, namely, 
“Whether something exists or not is ascertained on account of pramāṇas.”109 That 
is to say, something exists if at least one of the pramāṇas can provide evidence for 
it; something does not exist if no pramāṇa provides evidence for it. Only after one 
has shown that none of the pramāṇas – inference, scripture, or perception – pro-
vides evidence for the existence of objects can we safely conclude that there are 
none.110 
Now Vasubandhu turns to perception, to show that it, too, really doesn’t 
provide any evidence for the existence of objects. Notice that Vasubandhu is pro-
ceeding in the opposite order from AKBh IX. There, after first summarily dismiss-
ing perception, he proceeds to show that there is no scriptural evidence for a self, 
and then demonstrates that there is no inferential evidence for one, either. Here, 
he first deals with the alleged inferential evidence for objects, then with scripture, 
and now finally with perception. Moreover, when it comes to the self he invests 
far more effort in rejecting scriptural evidence than with respect to external ob-
jects. This difference in procedure may have something to do with the fact that, 
when it comes to the existence of a self, it was scriptural evidence that was of 
paramount importance for the Buddhists; for there was a large and influential 
group of Buddhists who thought that the existence of a pudgala was sanctioned 
108 See above, pp. 721–722.
109 Again, Vātsyāyana expresses the same principle in NBh ad NS 2.2.18 see above p. 728. 
110 To put the point yet another way: The attempt to prove the impossibility of external objects 
in vv. 11–15, while sufficient to raise questions about whether the Buddha intended his references 
to āyatanas literally, is not strong enough by itself to overcome other evidence of their existence, 
especially that provided by perception. It is, in the final analysis, the absence of any evidence at 
all for the existence of something that is, for Vasubandhu, the most persuasive consideration in 
support of its non-existence.
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by the Buddha himself. Therefore, scriptural evidence needed to be addressed 
more extensively, and prior to reason. When it came to the existence of an exter-
nal world, on the other hand, the relative importance of the evidence may have 
seemed different to Vasubandhu. Buddhist scripture, meanwhile, does not make 
very many clear pronouncements about the existence or non-existence of an ex-
ternal world, compared to the scriptural statements that refer to persons. Indeed, 
it is rational objections that first come to mind when someone suggests that we 
are not really experiencing objects: How, then, do you explain the impression 
that our experience is not self-generated, but dependent on factors outside us, or 
that specific experiences are restricted to certain places and certain times, etc.? 
For these reasons, one may speculate, in the Viṃśikā it is the evidence of reason 
that Vasubandhu tackles first, then scripture, then perception. Long-standing 
habits of argumentation within Buddhist doctrinal literature may also have played 
a role, since examining doctrine through reasoning and scripture, yukti and 
āgama, was a well-established method, whereas the pramāṇas – including per-
ception – were by comparison a more recently developed conceptual framework. 
The evidence that perception might offer for external objects is its mere 
occurrence, as it is subsequently known: if one knows that one just perceived 
something, surely this would be evidence for the existence of a perceived object. 
So how is then the cognition that an object was perceived possible without the 
existence of an object?111 In v. 16 Vasubandhu declares that this cognition indeed 
arises in the same way as dream cognitions. Moreover, the idea “this object was 
perceived by me” (idaṃ me pratyakṣam) arises at a time when no external object 
is seen, for it is presented by a mental cognition (manovijñāna) which occurs after 
the sensory cognition has already disappeared – and this time-gap becomes even 
more pertinent if it is assumed that an alleged external object would be momen-
tary, as this object would then already have disappeared at the time of its percep-
tion. Nor does memory establish a previous experience of the object remembered, 
according to the principle that one can only remember something one has previ-
ously experienced; for Vasubandhu has shown in the course of his discussion (in 
the āyatana section) that a cognition can arise possessing the appearance of an 
object even in the absence of an external object. That kind of cognition can serve 
111 VśV 8,23f.: asaty arthe katham iyaṃ buddhir bhavati pratyakṣam iti. In line with Vasuba- 
ndhu’s following account of pratyakṣabuddhi we take this concept to refer specifically to a cogni-
tion about an (immediately) past perception, whose content is given as idaṃ me pratyakṣam iti at 
VśV 8,29. This could be taken as “this [was] my perception” or “this [was] perceived by me” (or, 
more literally: “this [was] perceptually evident for me”). We take it in the latter sense because the 
discussion is primarily about perceived objects, but our main line of argument could also be 
maintained if pratyakṣam is taken to refer to perceptual cognition instead. 
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as the basis of a later memory as if of a previous experience of an external object 
(v. 17ab).
Through v. 21 Vasubandhu deals with a final series of altogether five objec-
tions, voiced as critical questions.112 The first (VśV 9,8–10) concerns the analogy 
of ordinary experience to dreams. If we are experiencing objects as in a dream, 
why don’t we realize their non-existence on our own, as we do for dreams? But, 
he responds, as long as one does not wake up one does not comprehend the 
non-existence of what one is experiencing (v. 17cd). In the same way, when one 
becomes awakened ( prabuddha) by attaining the highest non-conceptual or 
transconceptual cognition (nirvikalpakajñāna), one then realizes the absence of 
objects through the “pure mundane insight” (śuddhalaukikajñāna) that follows 
after transconceptual cognition (VśV 9,14–16).113 We note here in passing that this 
objection and the response to it, as well as the others to follow, are prima facie 
very difficult to reconcile with a phenomenalist interpretation of the Viṃśikā. 
The second objection (VśV 9,16–19) attaches to the restriction of cognitions 
according to time and place solely due to a specific transformation of one’s own 
mental series (svasantānapariṇāmaviśeṣa), to which Vasubandhu has alluded in 
v. 9. How can there then be any distinction of cognitions due to such causes as the 
association with sinful or virtuous people, or the instruction in true or false teach-
ings, if indeed neither such association nor such instruction exist? Vasubandhu 
responds (v. 18ab): Such distinctions occur because different mental series influ-
ence each other (anyonyādhipatitva), that is, causally affect each other. A specific 
cognition belonging to one series then arises from a specific cognition belonging 
to another series – a virtuous person or a sinful person, a true or a false teacher 
– not from an external object. Third, if both waking and dreaming cognitions are 
without external objects, why does wholesome or unwholesome conduct not 
bring about the same effect for those who are asleep and those who are awake? 
(VśV 9,23–25) Answer: In a dream, the mind is afflicted by torpor (middha), hence 
the difference from a waking cognition (v. 18cd). Fourth, if all “this” is indeed 
mere cognition, there is neither body nor speech. Why, then, do sheep die when 
killed by slaughterers? Or if their death is indeed not caused by the slaughterer, 
how can the slaughterer then be subject to the fault of taking life ( prāṇātipāta)? 
(VśV 9,23–10,2). Here, too, Vasubandhu invokes influence by another person’s 
cognition (vv.19–20): the death of the sheep is due to a specific cognition in an-
other mental series (the slaughterer) which results in an obstruction of the vital 
112 Frauwallner, on the other hand, takes this section to begin already with v. 16 (2010: 388), 
after the “real” argument against the external world in vv. 11–15. 
113 See Schmithausen 2005: 54ff. for pertinent further remarks on how this “subsequent in-
sight” was understood in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda. 
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faculty ( jīvitendriya), causing the sheep’s mental series to cease reproducing 
itself. Vasubandhu supports this idea – a fully mind-based account of karmic 
efficacy and human life – by pointing to the example of how a demon’s mental 
powers might cause a person to lose their memory or be possessed. Another 
example is drawn from Buddhist scripture, from the Upālisūtra,114 where the 
Buddha claims – against the Jainas – that acts of violence (daṇḍa) by force of the 
mind entail more serious offences than those carried out by force of body and 
speech. In supporting his claim, the Buddha recalls how ṛṣis or other holy men 
enraged by kings destroy large areas through rain of stones and fire, solely by 
force of their thoughts, thus killing many living beings. Surely, the example works 
only if the destruction is indeed mentally caused, and not brought about through 
some other kind of cause. Hence these examples lend scriptural support to the 
claim that cognitions, mental acts, can result in the taking of life, which, though 
not a physical matter, is nevertheless real in terms of having actual karmic 
consequences. 
The fifth and last objection asks whether, if “this” is only mere-cognition, one 
can know other minds (VśV 10,19–21) – the Chinese translations supply a ratio-
nale behind this question, absent from the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions: if one 
can indeed know other minds, then this would invalidate the doctrine of 
mere-cognition.115 The underlying assumption seems to be that this would be a 
case where a cognition knows something external to itself (or existing inde-
pendently of the mental series to which it belongs), and that this is in contradic-
tion with mere-cognition. Vasubandhu declares in his reply that knowledge of 
other minds does not truly apprehend them as they are, just like knowledge of 
one’s own mind does not apprehend it as it really is – in its true inexpressible 
nature, which can solely be known by Buddhas; for ordinary knowledge has not 
yet abandoned the subject-object-dichotomy (v. 21). 
Vasubandhu does not deny that this is indeed a case where a cognition knows 
something “external”, but merely points out that this knowledge is not real 
knowledge, as far as ordinary people are concerned. This suggests that as far as 
different mental series are concerned, the idea that something external (a mental 
event of series A) causes a cognition (in mental series B) having that cause’s 
image is acceptable. What would make this account, which in general form would 
later become identified as a Sautrāntika position, unacceptable for external phys-
ical objects is that we have no evidence for their existence, given the arguments 
Vasubandhu adduced before. Interpreted in this way, in fact, the response to the 
114 Frauwallner 2010: 391.
115 Yamabe 1998: 27, n. 26. 
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objection on other minds would lend additional support to the view that the 
Viṃśikā is not just about denying the cognition of external reality, but more spe-
cifically about denying the existence of physical objects of experience.116 
This declaration leads over to the concluding verse 22: 
This establishing of mere-cognition has been carried out by me, according to my abilities. 
But this [mere-cognition] is not conceivable in all its aspects; it is the domain of the Buddha.
As he explains in the commentary, mere-cognition cannot be conceived (cintya) 
in all of its aspects by people like himself, “for it is not an object of reasoning” 
(tarkāviṣayatvāt) – of the kind of reasoning called tarka which in many Buddhist 
sources is associated with limited cognitive faculties, often characteristic of 
Tīrthikas, of non-Buddhist “outsiders” (bāhyaka). The true nature of reality is 
ultimately inaccessible to such reasoning.117 In the Triṃśikā, Vasubandhu states 
(vv. 26–28): 
As long as cognition does not abide in mere-cognition the burden of the duality of appre-
hension does not cease. 
For even through the apprehension, “[All] this is mere cognition”, one does not abide in that 
[cognition] alone, because one [still] places something before oneself. 
If, on the other hand, cognition does not apprehend an object-support, then it stands firm 
in being mere cognition because, due to the absence of that [object] which is grasped, there 
is [also] no grasping of that [cognition which would grasp the object].118
116 Yamabe (1998: 30) thinks that ayathārtham (for “knows wrongly”) implies that an object 
(artha) exists, i.e. the other person’’s mind, and that hence the existence of different mental 
series is presupposed. We agree with Yamabe’s conclusion, although the expression ayathārtham 
can just as well be used idiomatically, without implying the existence of the other mind as an 
artha. Cf. further Yamabe for how the Cheng weishi lun, relying on an ālayavijñāna, explains the 
knowledge of other minds. 
117 See the discussion in Krasser 2004, occasioned by Dignāga’s statement in the closing verses 
to his Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti that the dharma is not the object of tarka. On p. 138f., Krasser 
lists several passages from different genres of Buddhist literature – the Dīvyāvadāna as well as 
Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda works such as the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra or the Mahāyānasaṅgraha – 
that state the dharma (or mahāyāna) to be outside the scope of tarka, on account of its being deep 
and unfathomable. In its function, Dignāga’s closing statement to the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti is 
comparable to Vasubandhu’s closing verse of the Vś. Both signal a soteriological limitation of the 
methods of reasoning they applied in their respective works, in what could be taken as an apolo-
getic gesture. 
118 Trś 26–28: yāvad vijñaptimātratve vijñānaṃ nāvatiṣṭhati / grāhadvayasyānuśayas tāvan na 
vinivartate // vijñaptimātram evedam ity api hy upalambhataḥ / sthāpayann agrataḥ kiñcit ta- 
nmātre nāvatiṣṭhate // yadā tv ālambanaṃ vijñānaṃ naivopalabhate tadā / sthitaṃ vijñānamā- 
tratve grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt //. 
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The final argument is reminiscent of a pattern of realization comprising several 
stages that can be traced in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda works ascribed to Asaṅga 
or Maitreya, and also in Vasubandhu’s own Trisvabhāvanirdeśa:119 There is an 
initial apprehension of mere-cognition, still tainted by duality. Realizing that 
when cognition does not apprehend external objects, it is also not something 
which apprehends – a grāhaka – a deeper insight arises which Vasubandhu in 
the Triṃśikā identifies as cognition “standing firm in being mere cognition.” As 
he clarifies in Triṃśikā v. 25, this state for him amounts to the realization of 
suchness, or tathatā. The Triṃśikā thereby suggests that there are different stages 
in the (meditative) realization of the vijñaptimātratā, an initial “apprehension” 
and a fuller and firmer “abiding.” We do not have to explore the complex edifice 
of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda soteriology any further, for the point seems clear 
enough: there are certain aspects of mere-cognition as “suchness” which are only 
realized in a higher meditative state, the nirvikalpasamādhi or transconceptual 
meditation.120 
This consideration may also provide us with an ulterior rationale for the 
negative argument strategy Vasubandhu pursues in his Viṃśikā – to be placed 
alongside the fact we find appeals to arguments from ignorance elsewhere in 
Indian philosophy and that Vasubandhu had employed the same strategy pre- 
viously himself, in AKBh IX. Aware that one’s object of proof – mere-cognition – 
has aspects that are inaccessible to argument, one will be hesitant to try to prove 
it directly. One will be more confident, rather, in showing that the negation of 
one’s thesis is false simply from the fact there there is no evidence for it. For pre-
sumably, if it were true, there would be some evidence for it. Thus, by implica-
tion, mere-cognition is established as true.
In conclusion, we have attempted to demonstrate that the elements of an ar-
gumentum ad ignorantiam are present in the Viṃśikā, and even more: that these 
elements provide the treatise with a structure and a strategy. The overall plan of 
the treatise is negative. There is no clear statement of an anumāna establishing 
mere-cognition at the outset (v. 1 or its prose equivalent). Each of the pramāṇas, 
inference, scripture, and perception, is considered in turn in three sections, re-
spectively, vv. 1–7, 8–15, and 16–17ab. For each pramāṇa the negative conclusion 
is reached that it does not provide evidence for the existence of objects. Even the 
119 MSA 6.6–9, MV 1.6, as well as MSA 11,47f. and 14,23ff. Cf. also Trisvabhāvanirdeśa 36–37: 
cittamātropalambhena jñeyārthānupalambhatā / jñeyārthānupalambhena syāc cittānupala- 
mbhatā // dvayor anupalambhena dharmadhātūpalambhatā / dharmadhātūpalambhena syād 
vibhutvopalambhatā // Cf. further Laṅkāvatārasūtra 10.256–258, and, on its basis, Kamalaśīla’s 
first Bhāvanākrama 210,16–211,20.
120 See Schmithausen 2005: 54. 
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proof of the impossibility of objects within the āyatana section is not meant to 
stand on its own, but it subserves the point that there is no scriptural evidence for 
them. The overall strategy of the text is epistemological, we could say, not meta-
physical. It considers for each pramāṇa what it can prove; is it powerful enough 
to establish the existence of things that are causing our cognitions? And in each 
case it answers, no. While discussing five critical questions in VśV 9,8–10,28 (vv. 
17cd–21), Vasubandhu also puts forward arguments that contain a denial of the 
existence of external physical objects, whereas he regards an account of cogni-
tion and karmic retribution which only posits different mental series that causally 
interact with each other to be acceptable; this lends additional support to an 
idealist reading of the text. 
Careful not to offend against the Mahāyāna doctrine that the true nature of 
reality can only be known in nirvikalpasamādhi, Vasubandhu refrains from 
stating his conclusion himself. He leaves it for the reader to draw the conclusion, 
in accordance with the principle he has enunciated in the course of his discussion, 
“Whether something exists or not is ascertained on account of the pramāṇas”, 
namely: objects outside of consciousness do not exist.
This does not mean, however, that the physical entities we know as visible 
form, etc., do not exist at all, Vasubandhu is also careful to say (VśV 6,14–21). 
Dharmanairātmya does not mean that dharmas do not exist. Rather, it means that 
dharmas are without the nature they are imagined to have by the unenlightened, 
as grāhya, grāhaka, etc. Dharmas exist in their inexpressible nature (anabhilā- 
pyenātamanā), which is known only by the Buddhas. But it is by the teaching of 
mere-cognition – that dharmas such as visible form, in particular, do not stand as 
entities over against, and independently of, cognition – that one realizes the 
dharmanairātmya, which culminates in the (transconceptual) comprehension of 
their inexpressible nature. It is, in short, not only possible to detect the pattern of 
an argumentum ad ignorantiam in the Viṃśikā – just like such a pattern can be 
detected in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX – but also to indicate a reason for why 
Vasubandhu might have chosen this argument as a strategy for the specific case 
of establishing mere-cognition. 
Appendix: the refutation of the  pudgala in 
Asaṅga’s  Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra 
The refutation of the pudgala as a real substance (dravyataḥ) in Asaṅga’s 
Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra might similarly be viewed to express an argumentum ad 
ignorantiam: 
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The pudgala must be said to exist as a [mere] designation ( prajnaptyastitayā) but not as a 
[real] substance (dravyataḥ), because one does not apprehend [it] (nopalambhāt) […] (MSA 
18.92ac’).121 
Vasubandhu, the presumed author of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkārabhāṣya, 
explains: 
[Pudgalavādin:] But how can one know that this [ pudgala] does not exist as a [real] sub-
stance? [Answer:] Because one does not apprehend [it] [MSA 18.92c’]. Indeed, contrary to 
[dharmas] such as visible [things], this [ pudgala] is not perceived as a [real] substance. [The 
Pudgalavādin:] But what is called “apprehension” [also consists in] a cognition by the intel-
lect (buddhi). Now, it is not the case that [we] Pudgalavādins do not cognize the pudgala 
through the intellect. Moreover, the Blessed One has said: “In this very life, [the living 
being] perceives an ātman, designates [an ātman].”122 
Although “a cognition by the intellect” could refer to a mental awareness (manovi- 
jñāna), hence a kind of perception, as Sthiramati seems to interpret it,123 it could 
also refer to inference, one of the two pramāṇas capable of establishing an entity 
as a real substance (*dravyasat), as Sthiramati also acknowledges.124 Thus, 
Asaṅga’s assertion “because one does not apprehend [it]” should perhaps be 
taken to mean, because one does not apprehend it at all – not only perceptually 
but also inferentially and, as the passage further suggests, scripturally; for the 
Pudgalavādin, as Vasubandhu represents him, reacts to Asaṅga’s assertion by 
citing both “cognition by the intellect” and scripture as support for his view. 
On this background, one might argue that Vasubandhu extends this strategy 
“because one does not apprehend it”, limited to the refutation of the pudgala in 
his Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkārabhāṣya, to the refutation of a self more generally in 
AKBh IX. Nevertheless, later in his MSA commentary Vasubandhu states:
So far (evaṃ tāvat), [it is] by resorting to reason(ing) [alone that it has been demonstrated 
that] the pudgala is not apprehended (nopalabhyate) as a [real] substance. And [this can 
also be demonstrated by resorting to scripture,] because [the Blessed One has] taught [that] 
all dharmas are selfless, [that] ultimately [there is nothing but] emptiness and [that] to per-
ceive a self is harmful (ātmopalambhe doṣaḥ) [MSA 18.101].125
121 Eltschinger 2010: 305, replacing “perceive” with “apprehend” for upalambha.
122 Eltschinger 2010: 308–309, emended. 
123 Cf. Eltschinger 2010: 309 n. 58. 
124 Cf. Eltschinger 2010: 308 n. 56. 
125 Eltschinger 2010: 322, emended.
  The interpretation of Vasubandhu’s  Viṃśikā    751
This does seem to suggest a more direct strategy, namely, the pudgala is disproved 
by various arguments Asaṅga has brought forward – it cannot be a real thing if, 
as the pudgalavādin maintains, it is neither the same as nor different from the 
skandhas (311–316); it cannot function as the “seer”, nor as an agent (317–322) – 
and by scriptural passages that imply that there is no self or that it is a pernicious 
error to believe that there is one (322–325). Still, the arguments in question have 
the nature of refutations of points typically made in favor of a pudgala, while the 
scriptural passages are cited in anticipation of references to scripture (e.g., the 
Bhārahārasūtra) the pudgalavādin will go on to make in support of his view (325). 
The overall strategy of the discussion of the pudgala in MSA(Bh) still seems to be 
primarily indirect or negative; that is to say, it rejects the existence of a pudgala on 
the grounds that there is no evidence for one.
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1884–1898.
Trisvabhāvanirdeśa – “Vasubandhu’s Trisvabhāvanirdeśa”. Edited by Louis de la Vallée 
Poussin, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 2 (1932/1933): 147–161. 
Trś – Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ. See Vś.
  The interpretation of Vasubandhu’s  Viṃśikā    753
VN – Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya. Teil I Sanskrit-Text. Edited by Michael Torsten Much. Vienna: 
Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991.
VS – Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, with the commentary of Candrānanda. Edited by Muni Śrī 
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